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INTRODUCTION

McNeil v. National Football League' marks one of the most

significant victories for players in the history of professional sports.2
* © 2009 Sean W.L. Alford.
1. 790 F. Supp. 871 (D. Minn. 1992).
2. See id. at 875 (denying summary judgment motions and allowing antitrust claims
brought by National Football League ("NFL") players against the NFL to proceed to a
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In McNeil, eight football players served as plaintiffs in an action
against the National Football League ("NFL" or "League") whereby
the players alleged that certain NFL labor practices violated antitrust
law.3 This landmark case established the precedent that the NFL
would be held accountable under antitrust law for the labor restraints
it imposed on its players.' At the time of the verdict, Professor Peter
Foley of the Franklin Pierce Law Center commented, "the McNeil
verdict gives the players a rather menacing gun-the collective
bargaining equivalent of an AK-47. ''5 Since the 1992 decision, players
have taken major strides both in terms of their bargaining rights as a
collective union and in terms of their individual bargaining rights in
negotiations with clubs. In 1992, prior to the decision, the average
annual salary for NFL players was $551,000.6 In the years subsequent
to the McNeil decision, average salaries have skyrocketed.7 The
increases suggest a causal relationship between the McNeil decision
and players' individual bargaining power. In 2005, NFL clubs
reportedly paid players an average of $1.4 million a year, nearly $1
million more than the average immediately prior to the McNeil
decision.8 In 2008, NFL clubs spent over $4.5 billion on players,
representing an estimated sixty percent of total revenues across the
League. In addition to these quantitative improvements, players have
jury trial).
3. Id.
4. See id. at 877-88 (allowing a jury to decide whether or not the NFL's labor system
violated antitrust laws); McNeil v. NFL, Civ. No. 4-90-476, 1992 WL 315292, at *1 (D.
Minn. Sept. 10, 1992) [hereinafter McNeil Verdict] (articulating the jury instructions and

the voting outcome at trial).
5. Pete Foley, A Sporting Chance for Professional Players: Football's Antitrust
Weapon, CONN. L. TRIB., Nov. 30, 1992, at 16.
6.

MICHAEL LEEDS & PETER VON ALLMEN, THE ECONOMICS OF SPORTS 226

(2002).
7. See Richard Aim, Smith Was Always a Commodity First, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Mar. 1, 2003, available at 2003 WLNR 13897246 (citing an average NFL salary of

$1.1 million); Big Blue and Even Bigger Green, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), Aug. 6, 2009, at 73
(summarizing average salaries for top NFL players); Rupert Cornwell, The Ultimate
Power Play: Did Black Sporting Heroes Pave the Way for Barack Obama, INDEPENDENT
(London), Oct. 18,2008, availableat http://www.independent.co.uk/sport/general/others
/the-ultimate-power-play-did-black-sporting-heroes-pave-the-way-for-barack-obama-

965325.html (citing the average NFL salary to be $1.25 million).
8. Larry Weisman, NFL Salaries up 5%; Bigger $ to Come, USA TODAY, July 7,

2006, at C1 ("NFL Players Association research says the average player salary rose 5% in
2005 to $1.4 million and the average starter earns $2.26 million. The median salary for
starters was $1.7 million, an increase of 17%.").
9. Dan Pompei, No Strike Fears-Yet: NFL Owners Opt Out of CBA; New Pact

Needed by 2011, CHI.TRIB., May 21, 2008, § 4, at 3 ("NFL owners knew they were giving
players quite a harvest when they agreed to extend the CBA [collective bargaining

agreement] through 2012 in March 2006. They didn't realize they also had thrown in most
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taken major strides in less measurable areas like bonus forfeiture
interpretation and revenue sharing among clubs. 10 Ever since the
players won the monumental decision in McNeil, the League has not
allowed a collective bargaining agreement with the players to expire
without an extension." The AK-47 that emerged from the McNeil
decision has certainly benefited football players, who have enjoyed

the longest running era of labor peace in professional sports and now
receive the highest portion of league-wide revenue among the four
major sports-basketball, baseball, hockey, and football. Owners
have also reaped benefits from the labor peace, notwithstanding the
players' major gains. Labor peace has contributed to the goodwill

among fans and has given owners the benefit of uninterrupted
revenue streams year after year. The NFL's total revenue was $6.97

billion in 2006 and is expected to grow as high as $9 billion in the near
future-making it the highest grossing league among the four major
sports. 3

Despite these gains, the NFL appears to be on the verge of its
next major labor battle, which will challenge the longevity of the
players' so-called AK-47. Since the McNeil decision, the NFL and the
of the farm. They have complained that assigning between 59 and 60 percent of league
revenues to players (up from about 54 percent in the previous agreement) is too much.
The NFL says it will spend almost $4.5 billion on player costs this year.").
10. Pursuant to the settlement that resulted from the McNeil decision, Minnesota's
Fourth Division United States District Court maintains the exclusive authority to resolve
disputes in the interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement between the NFL and
the National Football League Players Association ("NFLPA"). See White v. NFL, 899 F.
Supp. 410, 413 (D. Minn. 1995). Recently, the court has handed down a few decisions that
heavily favor players with regard to whether clubs are entitled to repayment of bonuses
paid to a player who violates the terms of his playing contract. See generally White v. NFL,
533 F. Supp. 2d 929 (D. Minn. 2008) (interpreting the collective bargaining agreement to
mean that roster bonuses are not subject to forfeiture for a player's failure to comply with
the terms of his playing contract); White v. NFL, Civ. No. 4-92-906, 2007 WL 939560, at *3
(D. Minn. Mar. 26, 2007) (interpreting the collective bargaining agreement to mean that
option bonuses are not subject to forfeiture for a player's failure to comply with the terms
of his playing contract). Since McNeil, the NFL has also expanded a revenue-sharing
system among its clubs, which serves to enhance competition among clubs in the free
agent market. See Judy Battista, New Commissioner Faces a Fiery Baptism, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 22, 2006, at D6 (discussing the NFL's revenue-sharing system and its role in the free
agent market).
11. See Aaron Kuriloff & Curtis Eichelberger, NFL 2009 Season Signals End of Parity
That Helped Build League, BLOOMBERG.COM, Sept. 10, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com
/apps/news?pid=20601079&sid=al7GOPMiGywY.
12. See Liz Mullen, Prime Cut Goes to NFL Players, SPORTS BUS. J., Mar. 3, 2008, at
1, availableat http://www.sportsbusinessjournal.com/article/58252.
13. Daniel Kaplan, Court Filing: NFL Carrying $9B of Debt, SPORTS BUS. J., Mar. 17,
2008, at 1, available at http://www.sportsbusinessjournal.com/article/58377 (discussing the
NFL's financial position).
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National Football League Players Association ("NFLPA")14 have
extended their collective bargaining agreement five times without any
interruption or work stoppage. 5 However, in May of 2008, the NFL
owners elected to exercise their contractual right to opt out of the
final two years of the current agreement.16 Thus, the current
agreement will now expire at the conclusion of the 2010 season as
opposed to the original expiration at the end of the 2012 season. 7 The
owners exercised their opt-out right because, according to NFL
Commissioner Roger Goodell, they believe that the current
agreement "isn't working" and are looking for "a more fair and
equitable deal."18 This discontent poses a threat to the League's
fifteen-year period of labor peace. 9 The hard stances taken by both
sides magnify the potential for the start of a new era of labor strife
and litigation. In January of 2008, "[a] defiant Gene Upshaw [then
head of the NFLPA] said that if the NFL's owners opt out of the
current labor agreement later this year, the players' union is ready for
a strike or the decertification tactics it used to get free agency after
the 1987 walkout. ' 2 Furthermore, Jeffrey Kessler, primary outside
counsel for the NFLPA, has stated, "[i]f [the NFL] move[s] to open
negotiations early we will ask for another increase [in the players'
share of League revenues]. '21 The League did not back down in the
face of this posturing and instead chose to accelerate the negotiation
process by exercising the opt-out. The owners have justified this
decision based on the belief that
[t]he current labor agreement does not adequately recognize
the cost of generating the revenues of which the players receive
the largest shares; nor does the agreement recognize that those
costs have increased substantially-and at an ever increasing

14. The NFLPA serves as a union for the players and negotiates on behalf of the
players with regard to the collective bargaining agreement with the NFL. See HOWIE
LONG & JOHN CZARNECKI, FOOTBALL FOR DUMMIES 295 (3d ed. 2007).
15. Id.
16. John Clayton, NFL Owners Vote Unanimously to Opt Out of Labor Deal,
ESPN.cOM, May 20,2008, http://sports.espn.go.comlnfl/news/story?id=3404596.
17. Id.

18. Id.
19. Id. ("The NFL officially notified its players union on Tuesday that it will opt out
of the current collective bargaining agreement, which could lead to a season without a
salary cap in 2010 and a possible lockout in 2011.").
20. Upshaw Ready for Strike if NFL Owners Opt Out of Labor Agreement,
ESPN.coM, Jan. 31,2008, http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/playoffs07/news/story?id=3224851.
21. Matthew Futterman, NFL Players Seek Bigger Revenue Cut, WALL ST. J., May 20,
2008, at B9.
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rate-in recent years during a difficult economic climate in our
country.2 2
The League further demonstrated the seriousness of its
discontent with the current labor environment when it retained Bob
Batterman, a notoriously tough labor negotiator, as a counselor for
upcoming negotiations.23 Batterman, an attorney in the New York
office of the law firm Proskauer Rose, is widely recognized for his
role in obtaining a favorable agreement for the owners in the
National Hockey League ("NHL") after a lockout that resulted in the
historic loss of the 2004-2005 hockey season.24
While the current dynamic between the NFLPA and the League
does not nearly match that of the aggressive and adversarial era
leading up to the McNeil decision, it reveals a genuine and potentially
irreconcilable tension that has not been a part of the NFL's labor
environment for many years. 25 But what happens when this posturing
and these insults come to blows? What are the alternatives to
negotiating and just how powerful are the guns behind the rhetoric
coming from both the League and the NFLPA? When the
negotiations break down and the posturing turns into action, the

22. Clayton, supra note 16 (quoting a League statement).
23. See Liz Mullen & Daniel Kaplan, NFL Brings in Veteran Labor Lawyer:
Batterman Says He's Part of League's 'New Approach' to CBA Talks, SPORTS Bus. J.,
Mar. 10, 2008, at 6, available at http://www.sportsbusinessjournal.com/article/58315
(recognizing the posturing that may be associated with the NFL's retention of labor
attorney Bob Batterman). The AmLaw Daily also noted:
Gene Upshaw, president of the NFL Players Association, told SportsBusiness
Journal in April that his "concerns were heightened" when he heard Batterman
had been retained, noting that NHL players crumbled before Batterman's hard
line. The NFLPA's outside counsel, James Quinn of Weil, Gotshal & Manges, says
that the owners "have this bizarre notion that they want to get tough, so they go
get Bob Batterman."
Brian Baxter, Proskauer's Bob Batterman Signals a Labor War in the NFL, AMLAW
DAILY, May 21, 2008, http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2008/05/smashmouth---p.html.
24. Baxter, supra note 23.
25. In the 1980s, the relationship between the NFL and the NFLPA turned into a very
public and very hostile battle of words. Jack Donlan, who at the time served as the lead
negotiator for the NFL, made cutting comments about the NFLPA's leader Ed Garvey,
calling him "vituperative and vitriolic" and saying, "Garvey's full of it." Dave Kindred,
Revenue Sharing: NFL 'Unalterably Opposed' to Idea, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 1982, at G1.
In return, Garvey publicly announced that Donlan was not a bargainer, but that he "wants
to break the union." William Serrin, N.FL. Strike Recalls Old-Time Strife, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 14, 1982, § 5, at 1. Garvey further accused Donlan of practicing the union-busting
technique known as "Boulwarism" whereby an employer unilaterally imposes its first offer
on its employees. Id.
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parties will almost certainly find themselves in the midst of another
McNeil-like lawsuit.
A lot has changed since the McNeil decision, and the owners
appear to believe that the AK-47 that the players once wielded does
not have the same firepower in a litigation context that it once had. 6
This Comment tests the longevity of the McNeil verdict and discusses
the potential outcome of a hypothetical antitrust lawsuit by the
players against the League that will likely occur in the event that the
current agreement is not extended. Ultimately, this Comment argues
that the League has underestimated the staying power of the McNeil
verdict and predicts that the players would win an antitrust lawsuit if
the NFL allows the current agreement to expire.
Parts I and II of this Comment explore and summarize the
application of antitrust laws in the labor context of the NFL. Part I
examines the substance and effect of an application of antitrust
liability. Part II discusses the nonstatutory labor exemption to
antitrust liability and outlines the process the NFLPA will have to
follow prior to effectively asserting an antitrust claim against the
League. After building a framework for applying antitrust laws, Part
III lays out a hypothetical antitrust complaint that the NFL players
could file against the NFL in the event that the current collective
bargaining agreement expires. Part IV outlines the NFL's most likely
response, detailing both general and specific defenses to the players'
allegations. Finally, Part V evaluates both sides' arguments and
concludes that the League would be wise to maintain labor peace by
extending the current agreement and not testing the firepower behind
the players' threats of litigation.
I. "THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING EQUIVALENT OF AN AK-47" 27:
ANTITRUST LIABILITY

In any industry, the prospect of facing the treble damages
associated with an antitrust action will surely intimidate a defendant? 8
In the context of collective bargaining in professional football,
however, this threat is so daunting that it has become the most
significant source of leverage in negotiations. 29 Furthermore, the
26. See Foley, supra note 5 (discussing the McNeil decision's AK-47-like impact on
the NFL's labor environment).
27. Id. ("[Tihe McNeil verdict gives the players a rather menacing gun-the collective
bargaining equivalent of an AK-47.").
28. See Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2006) (outlining threefold damages that
accompany private antitrust actions).
29. See Foley, supra note 5.
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prospect of antitrust liability can largely explain the NFL's decision to
avoid litigation and peacefully extend the collective bargaining
agreement time and again.30 In 1992, the McNeil trial gave the League
a glimpse of the impact of antitrust liability. The jury returned a
verdict with total damages of $1,629,000 to be split among just four
individuals. 31 The verdict set the foundation for an antitrust class
action lawsuit that could have resulted in catastrophic liability. The
League, however, avoided the impending catastrophe by settling a
class action filed promptly after the McNeil decision and has
continued to dodge potential antitrust liability by extending its
collective bargaining agreement with the NFLPA.3 2 In light of the
current tension threatening labor peace, the League should revisit the
application of antitrust laws to its labor practices. This Part examines
the types of activities to which antitrust laws apply.33 In addition, it
discusses the court's application of antitrust laws in the McNeil trial
and summarizes the standards courts have applied to professional
football.
A.

Antitrust Liability and the Rule of Reason

Unlike baseball, professional football does not enjoy an
exemption from antitrust legislation.' 4 As a result, players have the
30. See William B. Gould IV, Labor Issues in Professional Sports: Reflections on
Baseball, Labor, and Antitrust Law, 15 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 61, 80 (2004) ("[A]ntitrust

[becomes] the principal lever in collective bargaining [in professional football].");
Nathaniel Grow, A ProperAnalysis of the NationalFootball League Under Section One of
the Sherman Act, 9 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 281, 288 (2008) ("[Tlhe possibility of an
antitrust suit provides a significant deterrent to the NFL, discouraging the league from
negotiating in bad faith or otherwise unilaterally imposing policies on its players."); Kieran
M. Corcoran, Note, When Does the Buzzer Sound?: The Nonstatutory Labor Exemption in
Professional Sports, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1045, 1068 (1994) ("The most significant
economic weapon the union can use to break this impasse lies in the antitrust laws.");
Derek D. Yu, Note, The Reconciliation of Antitrust Laws and Labour Laws in
ProfessionalSports, 6 SPORTS LAW. J. 159, 159-88 (1999) (discussing the application of
antitrust laws in the labor context of professional sports).
31. See generally McNeil Verdict, supra note 4 (summarizing the damages awarded by
a jury to four of the eight plaintiffs in the lawsuit); see also White v. NFL, 822 F. Supp.
1389, 1398 (D. Minn. 1993) (summarizing the McNeil verdict), affd, 41 F.3d 402 (8th Cir.
1994).
32. White, 822 F. Supp. at 1389 (approving the class action settlement between the
NFL and NFL players).
33. The analysis in this Part regarding the types of activities to which antitrust liability
will apply ignores the nonstatutory labor exemption for antitrust liability. However, this is
addressed at length in the next Part. See infra text accompanying notes 60-72.
34. See, e.g., Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S. 445, 451-52 (1957) (" 'Congress had no
intention of including the business of baseball within the scope of the federal antitrust
laws.'... [But] the volume of interstate business involved in organized professional
football places it within the provisions of the [Sherman] Act." (citations omitted)).
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opportunity to subject the NFL to the daunting scrutiny of antitrust
laws. Most labor-related antitrust complaints rely on the authority of

§ 1 of the Sherman Act, which outlaws "[e]very contract, combination
...

or conspiracy, in restraint of trade."3 5 Section 4 of the Clayton Act

enhances the severity of an antitrust complaint in a private action by
providing for treble damages.36 In a strict sense, § 1 of the Sherman

Act outlaws any form of collective bargaining, which means that
collective bargaining could constitute a per se violation of antitrust

38
regulations.3 7 But, in Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.,

the United States Supreme Court recognized that certain
combinations that might otherwise constitute antitrust violations
"hold the promise of increasing a firm's efficiency and enabling it to

compete more effectively. Accordingly, such combinations are judged
under a rule of reason, an inquiry into market power and market
structure designed to assess the combination's actual effect."39 The
NFL falls within the purview of combinations the Court had in mind
in Copperweld. ° As a result, courts apply the rule of reason analysis
to antitrust challenges in the context of professional football.4 1
A rule of reason analysis "weighs the procompetitive benefits
and the anticompetitive effects of an agreement in order to determine
whether it should survive antitrust scrutiny."'4 In the context of NFL
labor disputes, courts have focused the inquiry on "whether the
restraint imposed is justified by legitimate business purposes."4 3 In
35. Sherman Antitrust Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
36. Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2006) ("[A]ny person who shall be injured in his
business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws.., shall recover
threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable
attorney's fee.").
37. See Grow, supra note 30, at 289 ("Read literally, the Sherman Act's broad
proscription of '[e]very contract, combination ... or conspiracy, in restraint of trade'
would outlaw collective bargaining." (alteration in original) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1)); see
also NBA v. Williams (Williams 1), 857 F. Supp. 1069, 1078 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) ("It has often
been recognized that any contract between an employer and employee is a restraint of
trade." (citing Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918))), afftd, 45 F.3d
684 (2d Cir. 1995).
38. 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
39. Id. at 768.
40. See N. Am. Soccer League v. NFL, 670 F.2d 1249, 1258-59 (2d Cir. 1982)
(subjecting the NFL to antitrust scrutiny under the rule of reason standard); see also Smith
v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1179 (D.C. Cir. 1978) ("The [NFL] clubs operate
basically as a joint venture in producing an entertainment product." (footnote omitted)).
41. See N. Am. Soccer League, 670 F.2d at 1258-59 (applying rule of reason analysis in
the context of professional football).
42. Jonathan B. Goldberg, Player Mobility in Professional Sports: From the Reserve
System to Free Agency, 15 SPORTS LAW. J. 21, 28 (2008) (citing NCAA v. Bd. of Regents
of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85,86-87 (1984)).
43. Mackey v. NFL (Mackey 11), 543 F.2d 606, 620 (8th Cir. 1976).
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order for a plaintiff to succeed in an antitrust action against the NFL
for restraints imposed in a labor context, the plaintiff must show that
the detriment of the restraint imposed (e.g., salary cap or restricted
free agency) outweighs the potential legitimate business benefits of
that restraint (i.e., competitive balance)." This determination is
ultimately up to the finder of fact, absent overwhelming evidence that
would support summary judgment.45
The uncertainty of this balancing test alone provides a major
disincentive for the League to enter into litigation. Unlike a per se
antitrust analysis, in which courts use strict legal precedent and
legislative history to determine whether an activity violates antitrust
laws, the rule of reason analysis opens the door to more
individualized scrutiny and therefore unpredictable outcomes. 6 The
McNeil case represents one of the few times in history when questions
addressing whether labor restraints in professional sports violate
antitrust law, under a rule of reason analysis, have been submitted to
a jury.
B.

Clearingthe Summary Judgment Hurdle

Because it is one of the few cases in which labor-related antitrust
questions have been submitted to a jury for consideration in the
context of professional sports, the McNeil case established unique
legal hurdles that the players must clear prior to jury submission. The
district court judge's rulings on both sides' motions for summary
judgment highlight a few of these hurdles. Judge David Doty, of
Minnesota's Fourth Division District Court, denied all of the motions
for summary judgment in McNeil.47 Two of the denials of summary
judgment in particular, however, represent significant and lasting
precedent in the analysis of antitrust liability in the labor context of
the NFL.
First, the NFL sought summary judgment based on the premise
that antitrust liability does not apply to single entities.48 Under the
44. Id.
45. See generally McNeil Verdict, supra note 4 (jury instructions and verdict).
46. See, e.g., Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49-59 (1977); Carlson
Mach. Tools, Inc. v. Am. Tool, Inc., 678 F.2d 1253, 1259 (5th Cir. 1982).
47. McNeil v. NFL, 790 F. Supp. 871, 874-75 (D. Minn. 1992) (listing the motions for
summary judgment and the court's orders with regard to these motions). Judge Doty
granted a partial summary judgment motion for plaintiffs concerning defendant's
monopoly power in relevant markets. Id. at 875. Regarding the market for professional
football player services, however, the summary judgment order only stated that a relevant
market existed for antitrust purposes. Id. at 892-93. The court did not determine whether
the NFL had monopoly power in this market. Id. at 896.
4& Id. at 878-80.
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single-entity defense, the League argued that its twenty-eight member
clubs "function as a single economic entity and thus are incapable of
conspiring within the meaning of § 1 of the Sherman Act."'49 The
court, however, declined to acknowledge the NFL as a single entity
for antitrust purposes and instead recognized NFL member clubs as
''separate economic entities engaged in a joint venture ... subject to
the Sherman Act." 50 Second, the NFL sought summary judgment
based on an argument that "plaintiffs' claims [should] fail because the
challenged restraints operate solely in a labor market and are
therefore outside the scope of the antitrust laws." 51 The court also
denied this motion, pointing out that precedent supports the
laws "to restraints that operate solely within a
application of antitrust
52
labor market.
As a result of these summary judgment rulings, the court
established that the NFL and its member clubs had exhausted their
legal protections against antitrust exposure and that their only means
of avoiding the wrath of treble-damage liability would be to persuade
a finder of fact that they should not be held liable. A jury trial began
on June 17, 1992.13 After nearly three months of arguments, the jury
returned a verdict on behalf of four of the eight players.5 4 While the
jury's verdict is certainly important in the context of a complete
analysis of the NFL's potential exposure to future antitrust liability, it
49. Id. at 878 (citing N. Am. Soccer League v. NFL, 670 F.2d 1249, 1251 (2d Cir.

1982)).
50. Id. at 880. The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari in a case challenging the
viability of a single-entity defense to an antitrust action brought against the NFL in a
licensing context. Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 538 F.3d 736 (7th Cir. 2008), cert granted, 129

S. Ct. 2859 (2009). The Supreme Court's ruling on this issue, however, is highly unlikely to
affect the single-entity analysis in a labor context. In American Needle, the appellate court
stated:
[T]he question of whether a professional sports league is a single entity should be
addressed not only "one league at a time," but also "one facet of a league at a
time." Thus, in reviewing the district court's decision, we will limit our review to
(1) the actions of the NFL, its member teams, and NFL Properties; and (2) the
actions of the NFL and its member teams as they pertain to the teams' agreement
to license their intellectual property collectively via NFL Properties.
Id. at 742 (internal citations omitted). Therefore, any Supreme Court decision should be
limited to the context of intellectual property.
51. McNeil, 790 F. Supp. at 880-81.
52. Id. at 881 (citing Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493
U.S. 411, 430-36 (1990)).
53. Mike Freeman, McNeil Trial Opens with Battle of Words, WASH. POST, June 17,
1992, at D2.
54. McNeil Verdict, supra note 4, at *1; Richard Sandomir, Judge Holds Key to NFL's
Future, HOUSTON CHRON., Sept. 11, 1992, at 5.
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is the jury instructions in the McNeil case that provide the best
template for future antitrust analysis.
In the instructions, the judge explained to the jury that it must
apply the rule of reason standard in determining whether or not the
NFL's labor system violated § 1 of the Sherman Act." With regard to
the burden on the plaintiffs, the instructions explained that the labor
system would not be a violation of the Sherman Act under the rule of
reason unless the plaintiffs proved by a preponderance of the
evidence: (1) that the labor system had a "substantially harmful
effect" on the competition for player services, and (2) that any
harmful effects on this market "outweigh[ed] any beneficial effects on
that competition."5 6 With regard to the burden on the defendants, the
instructions explained that if the jury found that the labor system had
substantially harmed competition, then defendants should be found
liable unless they could demonstrate that the system was "justified by
a legitimate business purpose" and that the system was "reasonably
necessary to achieve that purpose. ' 57 Furthermore, the instructions
recognized the competitive balance of the League as a legitimate
business purpose. 8
Overall, the McNeil case establishes that the NFL is not safe
from the grips of antitrust scrutiny. It also reveals that a jury will not
necessarily empathize with the League's need to maintain a
competitive balance. 59 But, the outcome in the McNeil case should
not paint the NFL as an open target for antitrust assault. The League
has a major safeguard against antitrust liability in the form of a
nonstatutory labor exemption that the players must overcome before
they can ever subject the League to a McNeil-like verdict again.

55. McNeil Verdict, supra note 4, at *2 ("To determine whether defendants have
violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act you must apply what is known as the 'Rule of
Reason.' ").
56. Id. at *3.
57. Id. at *4.
58. Id. ("Defendants contend that the First Refusal/Compensation Rules in Plan B
are justified by the legitimate business purpose of 'competitive balance.' Competitive
balance means that all of the NFL teams are of sufficiently comparable playing strength
that football fans will be in enough doubt about the probable outcome of each game and
of the various division races that they will be interested in watching the games.").
59. See id. at *1. The jury's determination that the NFL's labor practices violate
antitrust laws implicitly rejected the League's argument that the benefits of competitive
balance outweighed the labor system's restraints. See id.
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II. LOADING THE GUN: OVERCOMING THE NONSTATUTORY LABOR
EXEMPTION FROM FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS

Before the players can subject the NFL to antitrust scrutiny and
fire their so-called AK-47, they must execute a number of steps to
overcome a nonstatutory antitrust exemption that protects matters of
collective bargaining from antitrust scrutiny. In broad terms, this
exemption ceases to apply when the collective bargaining relationship
between the players and the League terminates. However,
establishing the termination of a collective bargaining relationship
presents a task in and of itself.
There is an inherent conflict between labor laws and antitrust
laws.' On the one hand, labor laws seek to advance uninterrupted
bargaining between unions and multi-employer bargaining units.6"
Because multi-employer bargaining units ordinarily consist of the full
set of employers for a certain class of workers, the bargaining
necessarily restrains the free market for individual employee
services.62 On the other hand, antitrust laws seek to outlaw and punish
such restraints.6 3 Courts and legislatures have recognized this conflict
and deferred to labor policy by limiting the application of antitrust
laws in the labor context. 64 This deferral has resulted in the
nonstatutory labor exemption. 6 The nonstatutory labor exemption
prevents courts from applying antitrust laws to bargaining
66
relationships between employers and unions.
With regard to professional football, courts have used a threepart test to determine whether the nonstatutory labor exemption will
60. See, e.g., Yu, supra note 30, at 185 ("The professional sports industry is a unique
arena in which the conflict between antitrust laws and labour laws is magnified.").
61. See generally National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C §§ 151-169 (2006)
(codifying national labor policy with regard to unions and private sector labor).
62. Mackey v. NFL (Mackey 11), 543 F.2d 606, 614 n.12 (8th Cir. 1976) ("[TJhe very

nature of a collective-bargaining agreement mandates that the parties be able to 'restrain'
trade to a greater degree than management could do unilaterally." (citations omitted)).
63. See generally Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (making restraints on free trade
illegal).

64. For an example of a statutory limitation on the application of antitrust liability in
the labor context, see Clayton Act § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (2006) ("The labor of a human being

is not a commodity or article of commerce. Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be
construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor, agricultural, or horticultural
organizations."). For an example of judicial limitations on the application of antitrust
liability, see Powell v. NFL (PowellII), 930 F.2d 1293,1301 (8th Cir. 1989) ("The Supreme

Court has recognized that disputes over employment terms and conditions are not the
central focus of the Sherman Act.").
65. See, e.g., Brown v. Pro Football, Inc. (Brown I1), 518 U.S. 231, 235-37 (1996)

(discussing the history and reasoning behind the nonstatutory labor exemption).
66. Powell H, 930 F.2d at 1301.
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apply and preclude the application of antitrust scrutiny. For the
exemption to apply, the restraint in question must (1) "primarily
'67
affect[] only the parties to the collective bargaining relationship,
(2) "concern[] a mandatory subject of collective bargaining,"' and (3)
be a part of "arm's-length bargaining. '69 The players have not
successfully overcome the exemption by pointing to a violation of
either of the first two elements. 70 However, Mackey v. NFL (Mackey
/1)71 plainly reveals that the players can use the third element, arm's
72
length bargaining, to overcome the nonstatutory labor exemption.
Broadly speaking, the third element is satisfied as long as a collective
bargaining relationship exists between the parties to a suit. Therefore,
this element will only cease to exist when the collective bargaining
relationship between the League and the players terminates, which in
turn destroys the nonstatutory labor exemption.
A.

The Powell Precedent

The most extensive judicial analysis of the point at which the
collective bargaining relationship ceases to exist in professional
football comes from the Eighth Circuit's decision in Powell v.
National Football League (Powell II).73 In this case, nine football
players and the NFLPA brought an antitrust action against the NFL
and its member clubs challenging the unilateral imposition of the
League's "first refusal/compensation system," which substantially
limited the extent to which players could obtain playing contracts on
the free market. 74 The NFL and its clubs asserted that they could not
67. Mackey H, 543 F.2d at 614; see Yu, supra note 30, at 167-68 (summarizing the
requirements of the nonstatutory labor exemption outlined in Mackey II).
68. Mackey H, 543 F.2d at 614.
69. Id. But see Brown II, 518 U.S. at 243 (explaining that the exemption applies to
more than just "agreements" as articulated in Mackey II; rather, the exemption applies to
any matters that are or have been the subject of the collective bargaining process).
70. See, e.g., Brown 1!, 518 U.S. at 231-32.
71. 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
72. Id. at 623 (holding that, based on a lack of "arm's-length bargaining," the
nonstatutory labor exemption did not apply to a policy limiting free agents' ability to sign
with another team).
73. 930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989).
74. Id. at 1295. The League imposed the first refusal/compensation system after the
expiration of the 1982 collective bargaining agreement, but without a subsequent
agreement. Id. at 1295-96. Therefore, this labor system was unilaterally imposed during a
period in which there was no effective collective bargaining agreement. The court defined
the first refusal/compensation system as follows:
The First Refusal/Compensation system provided that a team could retain a
veteran free agent by exercising a right of first refusal and by matching a
competing club's offer. If the old team decided not to match the offer, the old
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be subject to the antitrust challenge because the nonstatutory labor
exemption prevented such a challenge.75 The players, however,
argued that the exemption expired when the parties came to an
impasse in their negotiations and that any restraint that the League
subsequently imposed on the labor market was, therefore, subject to
antitrust scrutiny.7 6 The district court ruled in favor of the players,
holding that the nonstatutory labor exemption expires upon an
impasse in negotiations following the conclusion of a collective
bargaining agreement.77 However, the court of appeals reversed and
allowed the nonstatutory labor exemption to extend beyond the point
78
of impasse after the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement.
In support of this ruling, Judge John R. Gibson wrote:
The labor arena is one with well established rules which are
intended to foster negotiated settlements rather than
intervention by the courts. The League and the Players have
accepted this "level playing field" as the basis for their often
tempestuous relationship, and we believe that there is
substantial justification for requiring the parties to continue to
fight on it, so that bargaining and the exertion of economic
force may be used to bring about legitimate compromise ....
We therefore hold that the present lawsuit cannot be
maintained under the Sherman Act. Importantly, this does not
entail that once a union and management enter into collective
bargaining, management is forever exempt from the antitrust
laws, and we do not hold that restraints on player services can
never offend the Sherman Act. We believe, however, that the
nonstatutory labor exemption protects agreements conceived in
an ongoing collective bargaining relationship from challenges
under the antitrust laws.7 9
The Eighth Circuit recognized that impasse was a "recurring
feature in the bargaining process" and that it cannot necessarily end a
bargaining relationship. 80 While the Powell II case did not explicitly
state a triggering event that would terminate a bargaining
team would receive compensation from the new team in the form of additional
draft choices.

Id.
75. Id. at 1295.
76. Id.
77. See Powell v. NFL (Powell 1), 678 F. Supp. 777, 788 (D. Minn. 1988), rev'd, 930
F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989).
78. Powell 11, 930 F.2d at 1304.
79. Id. at 1303.
80. Id. at 1299 (citing Charles D. Bonanno Linen Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 454 U.S. 404,
412-14 (1982)).
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relationship, it held that "as long as there is a possibility that
proceedings may be commenced before the [National Labor
Relations] Board ... the labor relationship continues and the labor
exemption applies."'" This ruling has since served as the applicable
standard with regard to the expiration of the nonstatutory labor
exemption in professional sports. 2
The crux of the existence of a collective bargaining relationship,
and thus the applicability of the nonstatutory labor exemption,
ultimately turns on whether the players have an active bargaining
representative. 83 So long as the players have an active bargaining
representative, the League and its member clubs will enjoy the
protection of the nonstatutory labor exemption.84 In effect, precedent
suggests that the NFLPA must withdraw from its position as the
bargaining representative for the players before the players can bring
an antitrust action against the League. Furthermore, the Powell II
ruling's specific discussion of the National Labor Relations Board
("NLRB") implies that the NFLPA must decertify as a union in order
to overcome the nonstatutory labor exemption.85
B.

Powell to McNeil

Prior to the McNeil case, the players followed Powell II's
guidance for overcoming the nonstatutory labor exemption and
decertified the union. 86 Gene Upshaw, then executive director of the
NFLPA, recognized the need to decertify in a letter to the NFL after
the Powell II decision. In his letter he stated: "The NFLPA Executive
Committee has voted to abandon bargaining rights and begin the
decertification process. This action was made necessary by the Eighth
Circuit's decision, which purports to extend the NFLPA's labor
'87
exemption to [the NFL's] illegal activities.
It may appear that loading the players' so-called AK-47 merely
requires a facial statement and certification that a collective
bargaining relationship has terminated. However, it is important to
81. Id. at 1303-04.
82. See NBA v. Williams (Williams I1), 45 F.3d 684, 686 (2d Cir. 1995) (affirming a
district court decision that relied on Powell II in its determination that the nonstatutory
labor exemption exists as long as there is a collective bargaining relationship); McNeil v.
NFL, 790 F. Supp. 871, 883 (D. Minn. 1992) (recognizing the Powell II standard in
determining the termination of the nonstatutory labor exemption).
83. Powell II, 930 F.2d at 1303-04 (discussing the continuity of the nonstatutory labor
exemption so long as an active bargaining relationship is possible).
84. See id.
85. See id.
86. McNeil, 790 F. Supp at 883 n.14.
87. Will McDonough, NFLPA Set to Disband?,BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 7,1989, at 69.
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consider that decertification 88 and the abandonment of the bargaining
process "brings with it other consequences, namely the elimination of
many federal labor remedies."8 9 In the absence of a union that serves
as the collective bargaining representative, players also abandon their
unified front with regard to benefits, pension plans, and many other
issues. In addition, players must act as individual contractors in their
negotiations with teams, which can create a tremendous imbalance of
power. In actuality, decertification requires a true gut-check by the
players and exposes them to a potentially unfavorable labor
environment. 90
If the players are able to overcome the intimidating prospect of
decertification and decide to abandon the collective bargaining
relationship with the League, they will effectively overcome the
nonstatutory labor exemption and load a powerful legal weapon that
they can then use to expose the NFL to antitrust scrutiny.

III. PULLING THE TRIGGER: DRAFTING THE PLAYERS' COMPLAINT
AND LEGAL ARGUMENT

After the players have overcome the nonstatutory labor
exemption, they will be able to challenge several specific aspects of

the NFL's labor system in an antitrust complaint. This Part outlines
these specific allegations and evaluates the strengths and weaknesses

of each.
A.

Assumptions

The allegations in an antitrust complaint by the players will
largely depend on the landscape of the labor environment at the time

of its drafting. Therefore, this Comment addresses the most likely
88. See Pioneer Natural Res. USA, Inc. v. Paper, Allied Indus., Chem. & Energy
Workers Int'l Union Local 4-487, 338 F.3d 440, 441-42 (5th Cir. 2003) (discussing the
effect of National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") decertification); see also
PROCEDURES
GUIDE,
NATIONAL
LABOR
RELATIONS
BOARD
(2009),
http://www.nlrb.gov/publicationsfProceduresGuide.htm
(describing
the
NLRB's
certification and decertification of a recognized bargaining representative).
89. NBA v. Williams (Williams 1), 857 F. Supp. 1069, 1078 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), affd, 45
F.3d 684 (2d Cir. 1995).
90. These intimidating circumstances surrounding decertification led players in the
National Basketball Association ("NBA") to vote against decertification during the
basketball strike of 1994. Motion of the National Hockey League Players Ass'n et al. for
Leave to File Brief as Amici Curiae and Brief Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners,
Brown v. Pro Football, Inc. (Brown I1), 518 U.S. 231 (1996) (No. 95-388), 1996 WL 27682,
at *14 [hereinafter Motion & Brief Amici Curiae of National Hockey League Players
Ass'n et al.]
(discussing the NBA players' decision not to decertify the players union to
overcome the nonstatutory labor exemption).
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scenario under which the players would bring a complaint. While the
following assumptions apply specifically to the current landscape,

they also represent the most likely scenario under which an antitrust
lawsuit will be brought in the event that any collective bargaining
agreement expires in the future.9
The discussion of this hypothetical complaint is based on the

following substantive assumptions: (1) the NFL and the NFLPA will
not extend the current collective bargaining agreement before it
expires at the end of the 2010 league year, making the League go
through an "uncapped year";' (2) the League will unilaterally
implement a labor system substantially similar to that of the capped
years of the expired collective bargaining agreement;93 and (3) the
NFLPA and the League will come to an impasse in their negotiations
and the NFLPA will decertify and withdraw as the collective
bargaining representative for the players. This Comment also makes a

number of technical assumptions, including: (1) the players will file
suit in the Fourth Division of Minnesota's United States District
Court, Judge David S. Doty presiding;94 (2) the players will file suit
91. In other words, if the NFL and the NFLPA avoid litigation by extending the
current agreement, this Comment's analysis will remain relevant to the potential
expiration of the next agreement. The only way that an extension could affect the
relevancy of this Comment would be if a new agreement eliminated the salary cap, free
agency, the NFL draft, and the entering player pool, which is highly unlikely to happen
absent the type of litigation that this Comment examines.
92. See NFL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT 2006-2012, art. LVI, § 1, at 237
(2006) [hereinafter CBA], availableat http://www.nflplayers.com/images/fck/NFL%20
COLLECTIVE%20BARGAINING %20AGREEMENT%202006%20- %202012.pdf
("No Salary Cap shall be in effect during the Final League Year.").
93. See Powell v. NFL (Powell I1), 930 F.2d 1293, 1300 (8th Cir. 1989) ("Before the
parties reach impasse in negotiations, employers are obligated to 'maintain the status quo
as to wages and working conditions.'" (quoting Producers Dairy Delivery Co. v. W.
Conference of Teamsters Trust Fund, 654 F.2d 625, 627 (9th Cir. 1981) (citation
omitted))). Absent an impasse, the League could not implement a salary cap because the
final year of the current agreement is uncapped. However, once an impasse is reached,
employers have four options: "(1) maintain the status quo, (2) implement their last offer,
(3) lock out their workers (and either shut down or hire temporary replacements), or (4)
negotiate separate interim agreements with the union." Brown v. Pro Football, Inc.
(Brown 11), 518 U.S. 231, 245 (1996). In making the assumption that the League will
implement a system similar to that of the uncapped years of the expired agreement, this
Comment implicitly assumes that the League made offers prior to impasse to create such a
system. In Powell II, the court held that "[a]fter impasse, an employer may make
unilateral changes that are reasonably comprehended within its pre-impasse proposals."
930 F.2d at 1302 (citing Laborers Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Advanced Lightweight
Concrete Co., 484 U.S. 539, 544 n.5 (1988) (citation omitted)).
94. White v. NFL, No. 4-92-906 (DSD), 2008 WL 1827423, at *1 (D. Minn. Apr. 22,
2008) (noting that the Fourth Division of the Minnesota United States District Court
(David Doty's court) retains express jurisdiction to "effectuate and enforce" the White
settlement, which produced the modern collective bargaining agreement between the NFL
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shortly after the end of the 2010 season; and (3) this suit will be a class
action and the court will certify the class action prior to the
commencement of an adjudication of the merits of the complaint,
pursuant to the requirements delineated in Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. 95
Under these assumptions, Part II.B of this Comment addresses
the nature and substance of the players' antitrust complaint with
regard to specific elements of the League's current labor systemnamely, the League-wide salary cap, free agency, the entering player
pool, and the college draft. 96

and the NFLPA). While it is not "required" that this hypothetical lawsuit be brought
before Judge Doty-since the current agreement will have expired-Judge Doty's
expertise on these matters and historically favorable rulings for the players on interpretive
issues relating to prior collective bargaining agreements make him an appealing
adjudicator for the plaintiffs in the case (the players). Doty's player bias recently became
so apparent that the League challenged Doty's ongoing authority over collective
bargaining matters, alleging bias and prejudice. See id. at *6 (denying NFL's motion for
Doty's court to vacate a prior judgment and remove itself from the case or terminate its
continuing jurisdiction over collective bargaining issues, under the allegation that the court
has demonstrated bias and prejudice). Therefore, as a practical matter, the players will
almost certainly file before Judge Doty, and the League will have a very limited ability to
transfer the case to another venue.
95. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23. This class action assumption represents an important
distinction between this hypothetical suit and the McNeil case. The McNeil case was not a
class action lawsuit, but rather an individual suit brought on behalf of eight players.
McNeil v. NFL, 790 F. Supp. 871, 875 (D. Minn. 1992) ("Plaintiffs, eight individual football
players whose contracts with their NFL employers expired on February 1, 1990, assert
various claims .... "). However, the McNeil case was almost immediately followed by the
class action White v. NFL. See White v. NFL, 822 F. Supp. 1389, 1394 (D. Minn. 1993)
("Plaintiffs filed the present antitrust class action on September 21, 1992, less than two
weeks after a jury rendered its verdict in McNeil v. National Football League."). The
hypothetical lawsuit in this Comment assumes that the court will certify a class almost
identical to the one certified in the White case and is intended to encompass past, present,
and future NFL players. In White the court certified a class consisting of:
(i) all players who have been, are now, or will be under contract to play
professional football for an NFL club at any time from August 31, 1987 to the date
of final judgment in this action and determination of any appeal therefrom, and
(ii) all college and other football players who, [during the same time period], have
been, are now, or will be eligible to play football as a rookie for an NFL team.
Id. at 1395 n.4.
96. The allegations in the hypothetical complaint that follows address a few specific
systems within the current collective bargaining agreement: the League-wide salary cap,
restricted free agency, franchise and transition tags, the entering player pool, and the
college draft. While each of these topics is discussed in much greater detail later, it is
important to note that these systems are analyzed assuming that the League unilaterally
implements them exactly as they have been defined and as they operate under the current
agreement.
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Specific Allegations

1. Salary Cap
The NFL operates under what many people refer to as a "hard"
salary cap. 97 This means that a team's total player salary cannot
exceed the salary cap under any circumstances. 98 Unlike other major
sports leagues in which a tax or fine is levied against teams that go
over a prescribed amount of total team compensation,9 9 the NFL will
not approve transactions which put a team's salary above that team's
salary cap number.1° Along the same lines, the NFL has the right to
cut players from a club's roster in the event that the club does not
comply with the salary cap. 10 1
Table 1: Salary Cap Values l" z
Year

Salary Cap

2006

$102 million

2007

$109 million

2008

"57.5% of Projected Total Revenues, less League-wide
Projected Benefits, divided by the number of Teams [in the
League]"
"57.5% of Projected Total Revenues, less League-wide
Projected Benefits, divided by the number of Teams [in the
League]"
No Salary Cap

2009
2010

97. See Alexander A. Jeglic, Can the New Collective BargainingAgreement Save the
NHL?, 23 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 1, 26 (2005) (discussing the NFL's hard cap in comparison
to salary caps in other sports leagues).
98. Ryan T. Dryer, Comment, Beyond the Box Score: A Look at Collective Bargaining
Agreements in ProfessionalSports and Their Effect on Competition, 2008 J. Disp. RESOL.
267, 282 (2008).
99. See Robert Holo & Jonathan Talansky, Taxing the Business of Sports, 9 FLA. TAX
REV. 161, 204 n.158 (2008) (discussing the luxury tax associated with NBA's salary cap in
comparison with the NFL's salary cap); see also John C. Graves, Controlling Athletes with
the Draft and the Salary Cap: Are Both Necessary?, 5 SPORTS LAW. J. 185, 195-96 (1998)
(summarizing salary cap schemes in the NBA, MLB, and NFL). But see Stephen M. Yoost,
Note, The National Hockey League and Salary Arbitration: Time for a Line Change, 21
OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL. 485, 530 ("The NHL's new hard cap is even more restrictive
than the MLB's soft cap; the new CBA prohibits NHL teams from exceeding the cap by
paying a luxury tax, as the rich teams in baseball do.").
100. See CBA, supra note 92, art. XXV, § 4, at 145-46.
101. Id. art. XXV, § 6, at 146.
102. Id. art. XXIV, § 4(a), at 96 (defining the salary cap for the years covered by the
current collective bargaining agreement). This chart also takes the owners' recent opt-out
into account, which could result in an uncapped year in 2010. Clayton, supra note 16.
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Table 1 summarizes salary cap values for the 2006- 2010 seasons,
as defined by the current collective bargaining agreement.
These salary cap amounts apply to each NFL team, with a few
adjustments." 3 Notice that in 2008 and 2009, the salary cap is
determined as a function of projected total revenue for the NFL as a
whole.1 4 At the end of every League year, the NFL announces the
105
salary cap for the League year after the following League year. For
example, the NFL announced the 2008 salary cap prior to the end of
the 2006 League year. 106 The 2008 and 2009 salary cap numbers were
107
announced at $116 million and $123 million, respectively.
The NFLPA has expressed its displeasure with the salary cap
system and its intention to eliminate such a system. In the spring of
2008, the late Gene Upshaw stated, "I never wanted a cap in the first
' 10 8 In their
place. And I never will try to sell the players on one again.
complaint, the players will want to allege that the League's unilateral
imposition of a salary cap is an unreasonable restraint on free trade.
The allegation might read as follows:
The National Football League's unilateral imposition of a
salary cap that strictly limits the amount that each member club
may spend on player services violates § 1 of the Sherman Act as
an unreasonable restraint on the relevant market for services of
major league professional football players in the United States.
15 U.S.C. § 1.
To make this allegation successful, the players will have to make
109 The McNeil case
arguments according to the rule of reason.
10
provides the best template for the proof that they will need to offer."
A successful argument will establish, by a preponderance of the
103.

CBA, supra note 92, art. XXIV, § 4, at 96-101. Technically speaking, each team

may have a different salary cap number depending on adjustments for cash spent over the

salary cap in prior years. See id. art. XXIV, § 4(a)(ii), at 96. The Cap Adjustment
Mechanism ("CAM") is a new and fairly complicated system which discourages significant

discrepancies between the cash a team pays its players in a League year and the salary cap
for that League year. See id. art. XXIV, § 4(d), at 97.
104. Id. art. XXIV, § 4(a), at 96. For more information on calculating projected total
revenue, see id. art. XXIV, § 1(a)(i), at 82.
105. Id. art. XXIV, § (4)(b)(ii), at 96.
2008 Season,
106. Len Pasquarelli, NFL Salary Cap Rising by $7 Million for
2 6 9784
("Salary
8
http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=
2006,
7,
Dec.
ESPN.coM,
cap managers for several NFL teams say they were apprised this week that the league
spending limit will rise to $116 million per franchise for the 2008 season.").
107. Daniel Kaplan & Liz Mullen, Owners: Cap Not Absolutely Necessary, SPORTS
5 858 6
.
Bus. J., Apr. 7, 2008, at 1, availableat http://www.sportsbusinessjournal.com/article/
108. Id.

109. See supra text accompanying notes 34-46, 55-58.
110. See infra text accompanying notes 148-54.
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evidence, that: (1) the salary cap has a "substantially harmful effect"
on the competition for player services, and (2) the harmful effects on
this market "outweigh any beneficial effects on that competition."'I
The salary cap will likely present a difficult legal battle for the
players because they will not have the benefit of precedent on their
side. Salary caps in sports leagues have rarely been considered under
antitrust scrutiny due to courts' rigorous application of the
nonstatutory labor exemption.' 1 2 The only time a court has scrutinized
a salary cap under the merits of antitrust law was at the district court
level in NBA v. Williams (Williams I).3 However, the court's
discussion of the merits of an antitrust challenge in that case was
merely dicta because the holding of the case-that antitrust liability
would not apply to the league-was based on the application of the
nonstatutory labor exemption."14 Furthermore, the Williams I court
noted that a salary cap was a reasonable restraint, finding that it
would not violate antitrust laws even if the nonstatutory labor
15
exemption did not apply.
111. McNeil Verdict, supra note 4, at *3.
518 U.S. 231,250 (1996) (refusing
112. See, e.g., Brown v. Pro Football, Inc. (Brown 11),
to apply antitrust laws to the NFL's wage system due to the nonstatutory labor
exemption); Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954, 959 (2d Cir. 1987) (denying the application of
antitrust laws to a challenge of the National Basketball League's ("NBA") salary cap in
part because of the nonstatutory labor exemption); NBA v. Williams (Williams 1), 857 F.
Supp. 1069, 1078 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that the NBA salary cap does not violate
antitrust laws because of the nonstatutory labor exemption), affd, 45 F.3d 684 (2d Cir.
1995).
113. 857 F. Supp. at 1078-79.
114. Id. at 1078 ("Antitrust immunity exists as long as a collective bargaining
relationship exists. Accordingly, the NBA is granted the declaration it seeks-the
continued implementation of these challenged measures by the NBA do not violate the
antitrust laws as long as the collective bargaining relationship exists." (citation omitted)).
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling and declined to comment
on the merits of the salary cap under an antitrust analysis. NBA v. Williams (Williams II),
45 F.3d 684, 688 (2d Cir. 1995) ("Because the Players' position appears to be inconsistent
with the approach taken under the antitrust laws regardless of labor law and, in any event,
collides head-on with the labor laws' endorsement of multiemployer collective bargaining,
we conclude that the Players' claim must fail. We need not, therefore, address the various
arguments pro and con regarding the Rule of Reason.").
115. Williams 1, 857 F. Supp. at 1078 ("It appears that even if the nonstatutory
exemption did not apply, the Players' charge of a per se violation of § 1 of the Sherman
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, is insufficient to carry the day."). The court went on to say:
Even under a rule of reason analysis, however, it appears that the Players have
failed to show that the alleged restraints of trade are on balance unreasonably
anti-competitive. The pro-competitive effects of these practices, in particular the
maintenance of competitive balance, may outweigh their restrictive consequences.
Indeed, the Salary Cap seems to operate as a mechanism to distribute 53 per cent
defined gross revenue to the Players.
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Despite unfavorable precedent, the players can still form a sound
argument against the salary cap. To combat the dicta in Williams I,
the players can point to a few distinguishing factors. First, Williams I
dealt with professional basketball, which involves a different business
model than professional football.116 As a result, the players may argue
that any discussion of the harmful effect of a salary cap in
professional basketball is irrelevant to the harmful effect of a salary
cap in professional football. Second, the NFL will have gone through
a year without a salary cap before the League unilaterally implements
the salary cap that the players will challenge." 7 In Williams I, on the
other hand, the National Basketball Association ("NBA") had
continuously operated under a salary cap."' Therefore, the NFL
players will have the benefit of pointing to the competitive
environment of the League without a salary cap, whereas the NBA
players in Williams I had no such benefit. Absent any catastrophic
imbalance, the experience of the uncapped year will help the players
argue against the salary cap's beneficial effect on competition.
Specifically, the players will argue that the salary cap imposes a
harmful effect on competition for players' services. This argument
should not be difficult to prove. A salary cap implicitly reduces price
competition among the clubs with regard to player services.19 In
terms of measurable harm, it reduces the amount of compensation
that the players receive. 20
To attack the benefit of the NFL's salary cap, the players will
want to point to the competitive balance of other sports leagues that
do not operate under the hard cap to which the NFL adheres. 2 '
Furthermore, the players may want to introduce evidence as to how
those leagues decided on their labor systems. For example, the NHL
Id. at 1079.
116. See, e.g., Dryer, supra note 98, at 286 (discussing the differences between different
sports leagues).
117. See supra text accompanying notes 16, 102. The current collective bargaining
agreement's requirement that the final year of the agreement be an uncapped year reflects
commendable preemptive legal strategy by the NFLPA because it implicitly creates a
favorable argument against a salary cap for the players in an antitrust lawsuit, thus
enhancing the players' leverage in negotiations for an extension as the expiration date
approaches.
118. Williams 1, 857 F. Supp. at 1072-73.
119. Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., A Proposalfor the Antitrust Regulation of Professional
Sports, 79 B.U. L. REV. 889, 937 (1999).
120. Id.
121. See Jeglic, supra note 97, at 25-27; Piraino, supra note 119, at 937 ("With respect
to salary caps, less restrictive alternatives are available to promote competitive balance.").
Competitive balance refers to the ability of teams of roughly equal size and strength to
compete meaningfully with each other. See Piraino, supra note 119, at 893 n.14.
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union argued that its owners avoided unilaterally imposing a salary

cap for fear of the antitrust implications.122
2. Free Agency System
Unlike the salary cap allegation, the players will enjoy an
abundance of favorable precedent with regard to their allegation that

the free agency system violates antitrust laws. 123 The NFL's current
free agency system has several components that directly align with

prior systems which courts ruled were unreasonable restraints on
trade. The Mackey and McNeil cases, in particular, will provide the

players with significant ammunition in their arguments against the
NFL's free agency system.

Before applying precedent to the antitrust analysis of the current
system, it is first important to understand how the system works.
Articles XVIII, XIX, and XX of the current collective bargaining
agreement summarize the NFL's free agency system.1 24 Free agency
currently operates under a three-tiered system. The tiers are
determined by the number of seasons a player has accrued in the
126
League. 25 While "accrued seasons" has a very technical definition,'
it can be summarized as the number of seasons a player has played in
the NFL.
Players with fewer than three accrued seasons will fall into the

first tier of the system, referred to as an "exclusive rights free
122. Motion & Brief Amici Curiae of National Hockey League Players Ass'n et al.,
supra note 90, at *15 ("The NHL clubs, however, did not unilaterally impose a salary cap
or tax-even after an impasse in the negotiations had been reached-because of their
belief that the antitrust laws would apply.").
123. The free agency system designates the freedom particular players have to
negotiate or sign contracts with other teams. See CBA, supra note 92, art. I, § 2 (defining
"Free Agent").
124. Id. art. XVIII ("Veterans with Less than Three Accrued Seasons"); id. art. XIX
("Veteran Free Agency"); id. art. XX ("Franchise and Transition Players"). It is important
to note that this Comment assumes that the NFL will implement a free agency system as if
the League were in a capped year. See supra text accompanying notes 91-95. This will be
significant with regard to the number of accrued seasons required to trigger restricted and
unrestricted free agency. In an uncapped year, the accrued season requirements increase
for both of these categories. See CBA, supra note 92, art. LVI (outlining the changes in
accrued season requirements for free agency in an uncapped year).
125. See CBA, supra note 92, arts. XVII-XIX.
126. See id. art. XVII, § 1(a), at 56 ("For the purposes of calculating Accrued Seasons
under this Agreement, a player shall receive one Accrued Season for each season during
which he was on, or should have been on, full pay status for a total of six (6) or more
regular season games, but which, irrespective of the player's pay status, shall not include
games for which the player was on: (i) the Exempt Commissioner Permission List, (ii) the
Reserve PUP List as a result of a nonfootball injury, or (iii) a Club's Practice or
Development Squad.").
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agent. ' 127 Upon the expiration of their playing contracts, these players
may negotiate or sign a new contract only with their prior club, so
long as the club tenders the player a one-year minimum salary
contract.2 8 Only if no such tender is made may these players test the
free agent market. 9 As a result, exclusive rights free agents, whose
value to a club might surpass that of a minimum salary player, rarely
have an opportunity to test the free agent market.
The second tier of the system consists of players who have
achieved three accrued seasons. These players are referred to as
"restricted free agents." 13 0 A restricted free agent's prior club may
protect its rights to such a player after the expiration of that player's
contract by subscribing to a list of specific contract offers known as
"qualifying offers." '' Each qualifying offer corresponds with a right
of first refusal and/or draft choice compensation to the tendering club
in the event that the player negotiates and signs a new contract with
another club. 13 2 For example, say a player accrues three seasons in the
NFL and his contract expires with his prior club. The prior club then
tenders this player a qualifying offer for a right of first refusal and one
first round draft selection. 3 3 If this player then negotiates and signs a
contract with another club, the contract will not become effective
unless the prior club declines to exercise its right of first refusal and
the new club tenders a first round draft choice to the prior club.
The third tier of the system consists of players who have accrued
at least four seasons in the NFL. These players are referred to as
"unrestricted free agents" and, upon the expiration of their playing
contracts, they may negotiate and sign with any club with very few
limitations.1 " The most significant limitation on unrestricted free
agency is the potential for a team to designate an unrestricted free

127. See, e.g., Scott E. Backman, NFL Players Fightfor Their Freedom: The History of
Free Agency in the NFL, 9 SPORTS LAW. J. 1, 46 (2002) (discussing exclusive rights free

agents).
128. CBA, supra note 92, art. XVIII, § 2, at 56 ("Any Veteran with less than three
Accrued Seasons whose contract has expired may negotiate or sign a Player Contract only
with his Prior Club, if on or before March 1 his Prior Club tenders the player a one-year
Player Contract with a Paragraph 5 Salary of at least the Minimum Active/Inactive List
Salary applicable to that player.").
129. Backman, supra note 127, at 46-47.
130. CBA, supra note 92, art. XIX, § 2, at 58.
131. Id.

132. Id. art. XIX, § 2, at 58-62.
133. The qualifying offer for these rights ("Right of First Refusal and One First Round
Draft Selection") in 2009 would be for a one-year contract of $2,198,000. See id. art. XIX,
§ 2(b)(i)(4), at 59.
134. See id. art. XIX, § 1, at 57-58 ("Unrestricted Free Agents").
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agent as a "franchise" or "transition" player.'35 The current
agreement allows each team to designate one franchise player and

one transition player. 36 To designate a franchise player, a team must
make one of two qualifying tender offers to the player.137 The club
may choose to offer the exclusive franchise tender, which prevents

the player from negotiating or signing a contract with any other
club. 138 Alternatively, the club may choose to offer the nonexclusive

franchise tender, which grants the club a right of first refusal on
contracts negotiated with other clubs in addition to compensation of
two first-round draft picks from the signing club. 139 From a technical
standpoint, there is a difference between the two offers; from a
practical standpoint, however, both the exclusive and nonexclusive
franchise tenders almost always yield the same result-the player will
not sign with another club." 4 The current system also gives clubs the
ability to designate up to two players as transition players' 4' by

tendering each player a one-year contract for the greater of the
"average of the ten Largest Prior Year salaries" at his position or 120
percent of his prior year salary. 4a This designation allows for clubs to
obtain a right of first refusal on players who would otherwise become
unrestricted free agents. 143
These elements of NFL free agency-the three-tiered system and
franchise/transition designations-contain significant similarities to
systems that the players have successfully challenged in the past.
135. Id. art. XX, §§ 1, 3, at 68, 70-71. Teams may also use franchise and transition
designations on restricted free agents. Id.
136. See id.
137. Id.
138. The exclusive franchise designation requires a tender offer for either 120 percent
of the player's prior year salary or "the average of the five largest Salaries ... for that
League Year as of the end of the Restricted Free Agent Signing Period" for players at his
position, whichever is greater. Id. art. XX, § 2(a)(ii), at 68 (emphasis added).
139. The nonexclusive franchise designation requires a tender offer for either 120
percent of the player's prior year salary or the "average of the five largest Prior Year
Salaries" at the player's position. Id. art. XX, § 2(a)(i), at 68 (emphasis added). Notice that
the difference between the exclusive and nonexclusive tenders lies in the use of prior year
salaries and current year salaries used to compute the average of the five largest salaries.
140. For additional commentary on the franchise and transition designations, see
Dryer, supra note 98, at 283-85 (summarizing the franchise and transition designations).
141. Clubs may designate only one transition player if they have designated a franchise
player. CBA, supra note 92, art. XX, § 3(a), at 70-71. However, clubs may designate two
transition players if they have not used the franchise player--one of the transition
designations may be made "in lieu of designating a Franchise Player." Id.
142. See id. art. XX, § 4(a), at 71 (describing the "Required Tender for Transition
Players").
143. Id. art. XX, § 3(b), at 71 ("Any Transition Player shall be completely free to
negotiate and sign a Player Contract with any Club ... subject only to the Prior Club's
Right of First Refusal .... ).
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More specifically, these elements of the free agency system are
comparable to the "Rozelle Rule," which was found to have violated
antitrust laws in Mackey II, 1" and "Plan B Free Agency," which was
found to have violated antitrust laws in the McNeil verdict. 14 5 In
Mackey H, the Eighth Circuit addressed the NFL's unilaterallyimposed Rozelle Rule, which stated:
Whenever a player, becoming a free agent ... signed a contract
with a different club in the League, then, unless mutually
satisfactory arrangements have been concluded between the
two League clubs, the Commissioner may name and then award
to the former club one or more players, from the Active,
Reserve, or Selection List (including future selection choices)
of the acquiring club as the Commissioner in his sole discretion
deems fair and equitable .... 4
The court applied the rule of reason standard and upheld a
bench trial ruling that the Rozelle Rule violated antitrust laws as an
147
unreasonable restraint on the market for player services.
The McNeil decisions, on the other hand, addressed the antitrust
ramifications of Plan B Free Agency, which allowed for each team
to-at its discretion-restrict the movement of thirty-seven of its
forty-seven players via a right of first refusal/compensation system. 48
District court Judge David Doty described the right of first
refusal/compensation system in Powell v. National Football League
(Powell 1)149:

Under the Right of First Refusal/Compensation system,
every NFL club retains rights to "its players" even though, in
the case of veteran free agents, contractual rights to a player no
longer exist. When a veteran player's contract has expired and a
competing NFL club makes an offer to that player, the player's
144. Mackey v. NFL (Mackey H), 543 F.2d 606, 622 (8th Cir. 1976).
145. McNeil Verdict, supra note 4, at *1-2.
146. Mackey I1, 543 F.2d at 610-11.
147. Id. at 620-22 (applying the rule of reason to the Rozelle Rule); see also Mackey v.

NFL (Mackey 1), 407 F. Supp. 1000, 1003-11 (D. Minn. 1975) (discussing the findings of
fact and issuing a bench trial judgment), affd in part and rev'd in part, 543 F.2d 606 (8th

Cir. 1976).
148. McNeil v. NFL, 790 F. Supp. 871,875-78 (D. Minn. 1992); Powell v. NFL (McNeil
1), 764 F. Supp. 1351, 1354-59 (D. Minn. 1991). Although captioned as Powell v. NFL, 764
F. Supp. 1351 (D. Minn. 1991), this case is a consolidated case involving the McNeil
plaintiffs and focused primarily on the issues ultimately decided in McNeil v. NFL, 790 F.
Supp. 871 (D. Minn. 1992). As such, all short form references to this Powell v. NFL
disposition will use McNeil L
149. 678 F. Supp. 777 (D. Minn. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir.
1989).
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old team may keep the player simply by matching the
competing offer; the player's old club therefore is said to have a
"right of first refusal" as to the player's services. If the
competing offer is large enough, and the club to which the
player was previously under contract does not choose to match
a competing offer, the old club will receive draft choice
''compensation" which may be extremely costly to the acquiring
club. Plaintiffs allege that in addition to restraining player
movement, this system has effectively eliminated competition
among NFL clubs for player services. 150
The jury granting the McNeil verdict found that this system had a
"substantially harmful effect on competition" for player services and
that it was "more restrictive than reasonably necessary."' 5 ' These
findings led to the conclusion that Plan B Free Agency did, in fact,
violate antitrust laws under a rule of reason analysis.
Players quickly tested the McNeil decision's credibility. In
Jackson v. NFL,'52 filed just four days after the McNeil verdict, four
players sought to enjoin the League from restricting them under Plan
B Free Agency on the basis of a collateral estoppel argument in
connection with the McNeil outcome.'5 3 The court found in favor of
the plaintiffs and denied the League an opportunity to relitigate the
issue as to whether Plan B Free Agency violated antitrust laws.'54
These three cases-Mackey II, McNeil, and Jackson-provide
the players with persuasive precedent that supports an allegation that
the League's three-tiered free agency system and franchise/transition
designations violate antitrust laws. The current system operates on
the same foundation as systems that the court found were illegal in
Mackey II and McNeil. The current system, like the Rozelle Rule and
Plan B Free Agency, grants teams the opportunity to restrict player
movement via a right of first refusal and compensation.'5 5 The players
will want to draw as many parallels as possible to the Rozelle Rule
and Plan B Free Agency and might even argue that the similarities
are so substantial that collateral estoppel should apply and deny the
150. Id. at 779.
151. McNeil Verdict, supra note 4, at *1.
152. 802 F. Supp. 226 (D. Minn. 1992).
153. Id. at 228-29 ("Relying on the jury's findings in the McNeil case as the basis for
the application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel, plaintiffs also contend that they
demonstrate a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of their claims ....).
154. Id.at 229-30 (granting the use of offensive collateral estoppel with regard to the
legality of Plan B Free Agency).
155. See supra notes 144-51 and accompanying text (discussing the Rozelle Rule and
Plan B Free Agency).

2009]

DUSTING OFF THE AK-47

League the opportunity to relitigate the question of whether the
current system violates antitrust laws.
Challenging the legality of exclusive rights free agency, on its
own, should be easy for the players to do. This system explicitly
prevents players from testing the market for their services. An
example can best illustrate the damages associated with such a
system. Suppose an undrafted rookie offensive lineman signed a twoyear free agent contract with the Carolina Panthers in 2006.
Furthermore, suppose that player accrues two seasons and starts for
the National Football Conference ("NFC") at offensive guard in both
seasons' Pro Bowls. After the completion of the 2007 season, the
Panthers would be able to keep this player and prevent him from
testing the free agent market by offering him a one-year contract for
the League minimum of $445,000.156 In contrast, Alan Faneca-who
started at offensive guard for the American Football Conference
("AFC") during the same two Pro Bowls--obtained a five-year free
agent contract from the New York Jets worth $40 million, $21 million
of which is guaranteed. 57 This example shows the substantial
disparity that can occur between two arguably comparable players
due to the restraints of exclusive rights free agency.
Similar arguments to the one set forth above could be made with
regard to restricted free agents. 158 As a continuation of the example
discussed above, suppose the same player accrues a third season
under his exclusive rights contract and is voted to the Pro Bowl again.
The Panthers could essentially prevent the player from testing the
free market by tendering him a one-year contract of $3.043 million,
which represents the qualifying tender offer for right of first refusal, a
first round draft pick, and a third round draft pick. 5 9 By limiting the
player's ability to test the free agent market, the club has again
deprived him of potentially earning the type of money that Faneca
earned the year before. Furthermore, this example goes to show how
the tiered system suppresses the franchise and transition designations.
Keeping this star-caliber offensive lineman out of the free agent
market means that there will be one less contract to pull up the

156. See CBA, supra note 92, art. XXXVIII, § 6, at 179 (charting minimum salaries for
specific years according to accrued seasons).
157. Rich Cimini, Jets Sign Alan Faneca to Richest Free-Agent Deal in Team History,

N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Mar. 1, 2008, http://www.nydailynews.com/sports/football/jets/2008/03
/01/2008-0301.jets.sign-alan-faneca to-richest.freeage.html (describing Alan Faneca's
contract with the New York Jets).
158. See supra notes 130-33 and accompanying text.
159. See CBA, supra note 92, art. XIX, § 2(b)(i)(5), at 59.
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average of the top-five player salaries that teams have to tender to
designate a franchise player.
While the players will want to itemize their complaint to address
each of the elements of the free agency system individually, they will
also want to argue at trial that the system as a whole creates a selfperpetuating harm, as evidenced in the example above. The players
will want to argue that the limitations directly prevent top-tiered
players from achieving their true market value due to the absence of
price competition between clubs. In addition, the players will want to
argue that the effect on top-tiered players creates a trickle-down
effect that suppresses the market for all other players.
To satisfy their burden under the rule of reason, the players will
need to rebut the League's argument that exclusive rights, restricted
free agency, and the franchise/transition designations create
competitive benefits. In making this argument, the players will have
to prove that the restraints are more restrictive than reasonably
necessary to maintain competitive balance in the NFL because the
League will argue that the benefit of competitive balance outweighs
any harm cause by the labor restraints. The outcomes in Mackey II
and McNeil suggest that first refusal/compensation-based systems are
not necessary to maintain competitive balance in the League. 160 For
this reason, these cases will provide a strong platform on which the
players should base their arguments.
The players should take a piecemeal approach in their complaint,
addressing each of the individual components of the current system as
a separate and distinct violation of antitrust laws, as opposed to a
broad and singular challenge to the free agency system as a whole. By
taking this approach, the players can achieve incremental victories,
even if a court agrees with the League on certain issues.
3. Entering Player Pool
Prior to submitting the case to the jury, the court in McNeil ruled
on several issues presented for summary judgment. One of these
issues surrounded the potential threat of a unilaterally imposed wage
scale, which would have eliminated all individual player contract
negotiations.1 61 The court held that "a wage scale would likely injure
plaintiffs by eliminating their ability to engage in individual salary
negotiations with their NFL employers and that the injury is of the
160. See Mackey v. NFL (Mackey II), 543 F.2d 606, 621-22 (8th Cir. 1976); McNeil v.
NFL, 790 F. Supp. 871, 877 (D. Minn. 1992).
161. McNeil, 790 F. Supp. at 878 (describing one bargaining proposal with a wage scale
that prohibited individual contract negotiations after 1993).
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type that the Sherman Act was designed to prevent."' 62 The court
declined to grant summary judgment on the plaintiffs' claim
concerning the wage scale because the wage scale had not been
implemented and was merely a part of a proposal in the negotiations
between the NFLPA and the NFL. 163 However, in its rejection of the
motion for summary judgment, the court left the door open for future
intervention relating to wage scales: "[D]efendants concede: '[t]his
court's refusal to enter a permanent injunction against a League-wide
wage scale here would not preclude a challenge should the League
implement such a system-or take concrete steps to do so-at a later
time.' "164
In its complaint against the NFL, the players might turn to the
above-quoted language and challenge the League's "entering player
pool" as a de facto wage scale. 65 The entering player pool effectively
serves as a rookie salary cap within the larger salary cap. The pool
imposes a constraint only on the first year salary cap numbers of
drafted rookies. 6 6 All salary cap values for the years beyond the
rookie season are limited only by the team's total salary cap.'67 The
League-wide entering player pool increases from year to year by the
same percentage as the projected total League-wide revenue and,
similar to the larger salary cap, the League treats the entering player
pool as a hard cap that teams may not exceed. 6 Each team then
receives an allocation of this pool "based on the number, round, and
position of the club's selection choices in the draft.' 1 69 When the
League notifies a team of its rookie allocation, team officials receive
the total entering player pool number for the team but are not given
70
any suggested values for the individual rookies.1
While the entering player pool does not necessarily conform with
the strict wage scale that the court addressed in McNeil-in which the
League proposed to completely abandon all individual player
contract negotiations-it arguably represents a "concrete step"

162. Id. at 877.
163. Id. (declining to grant summary judgment due in part to plaintiffs' failure to show
the "immediacy concerning the implementation of the wage scale").
164. Id. (second alteration in original) (internal citation omitted).
165. See generally CBA, supra note 92, art. XVII (describing the "entering player
pool").
166. Id. art. XVII, § 1, at 51 (defining "entering player pool").
167. See generally id. art. XXIV ("Guaranteed League-Wide Salary, Salary Cap, &
Minimum Team Salary").
168. Id. art. XVII, § 3, at 51-52.
169. Id. art. XVII, § 3(b), at 51-52 (discussing entering player pool calculation).
170. See id. art. XVII, § 3(d), at 52.
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toward the implementation of a strict wage scale. 7' The McNeil
decision does not suggest that a wage scale needs to exist in its
strictest form to represent a violation of antitrust law. Instead, it
suggests that a step to implement a wage-scale-like system might be
challenged under antitrust analysis.1 2 The players should argue that a
unilaterally imposed entering player pool represents the exact
"concrete step" that the court discussed in McNeil. In their complaint,
the players should allege that the pool is narrowly tailored toward a
specific group of players and that its calculation essentially assigns a
contract value to each individual player.
To allow for flexibility in their argument regarding the entering
player pool, the players should present alternative arguments. First,
they should suggest that the entering player pool is a per se violation
of antitrust laws as "horizontal price-fixing."' 73 A stronger argument,
however, is that even if the pool were evaluated under a rule of
reason test, it would violate antitrust laws. Under the rule of reason
test, the players must establish that the pool creates a substantially
harmful effect on the competition for their services and that this is not
outweighed by a pro-competitive justification. The players should
argue that the entering player pool unnecessarily limits rookies'
ability to negotiate a fair market value. This argument will be more
persuasive for lower round draft picks (i.e., rounds three through
seven) than higher round draft picks (i.e., rounds one and two).' 74 The

players should argue that the entering player pool has the effect of
squeezing value out of the lower rounds in favor of the higher rounds.
In other words, teams budget an unfair portion of their entering
player pool toward first and second round draft picks who have
greater leverage in negotiations. This leaves the draft picks in the
third through seventh rounds with less room to negotiate. From this
perspective, the entering player pool substantially harms the earning

171. See McNeil v. NFL, 790 F. Supp. 871, 877 (D. Minn 1992); see also supra text
accompanying note 164 (discussing that players could challenge the implementation of a
more "concrete" wage scale than was evidenced in McNeil).
172. See McNeil, 790 F. Supp. at 877.
173. See Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5-6 (2006) (defining horizontal price-fixing
as "[p]rice-fixing agreements between two or more competitors"); see also ANTITRUST
RESOURCE MANUAL § 8 (1997), http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia-reading-room
/usam/title7/ant00008.htm (discussing per se violations of the Sherman Act, including
horizontal price-fixing).
174. LONG & CZARNECKI, supra note 14, at 298 ("The draft consists of seven rounds,
and each team is allotted one pick in each round. The team with the worst record in the
preceding season selects first. The team with the second worst record selects second, and
so on ....
").
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potential of lower round draft picks that would otherwise earn higher
salaries in a free market.
4. College Draft
The final piece of the labor system that the players will want to
challenge in their complaint is the NFL's college draft system. The
draft system grants each team exclusive negotiating rights for the
players it selects in the annual NFL draft.'75 These exclusive rights
extend for a period of one year.'7 6 When a team selects a player in the
NFL draft, the team is "deemed to have automatically tendered the
player a one year NFL Player Contract for the Minimum
Active/Inactive List Salary then applicable to the player."' 77 The
player, however, is not required to accept the tender offer and has the
opportunity to negotiate a separate deal with the drafting club (or a
club to which the player's rights are traded).'7 8 If the player and the
drafting club cannot come to terms on a deal and the player refuses to
accept the tender offer by the thirtieth day prior to the first Sunday of
the regular season, then the exclusive rights to the drafted player may
not be traded to another club, and the player must enter into a
contract with the drafting club or wait until the following year's draft,
at which point he may be drafted by any club, except the club that
drafted him in the initial draft. 17 9 If the player opts to forgo the season
in which he was initially drafted, he will be subject to the same
limitations discussed above with regard to the team that drafts him in
a subsequent draft.180 If the player then fails to sign a contract with
the subsequently drafting club, then he will become a "rookie free
agent"'' on the day of the annual college draft following the
182
subsequent draft.
The contract limitations imposed by the college draft certainly
restrict competition between teams in the market for player
services-specifically for the services of entering players. One
economic analysis, focused on players' ability to capture the marginal
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

CBA, supra note 92, art. XVI.
See id.
Id. art. XVI, § 3, at 46.
Id. art. XVI, § 4, at 46-47.
Id.
Id.

181. A "rookie free agent" is a player who has never signed an NFL player contract,
but is free to negotiate and sign a player contract with any NFL club, without "draft choice
compensation" or any right of first refusal. Compare id. art. I, § 2(t), at 5 (defining "free
agent") with id. art. I, § 2(af), at 6 (defining "rookie").
182. Id. art. XVI, § 8, at 49.
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revenue they create for teams, suggests that the exclusive rights
created by the draft system deny players the ability to capture their
83
true market value and effectively builds in profit margins for clubs.
The McNeil case provides little guidance for the players in terms
of challenging the college draft. In McNeil, the players presented
testimony with regard to the college draft, but the court declined to
allow the jury to consider whether or not the draft itself violated
antitrust laws. 1"I As a result, McNeil will not serve the players as a
persuasive precedent in their challenge of the college draft.
However, a separate case-Smith v. Pro Football, Inc." decided almost fifteen years prior to McNeil, supports the players'
challenge of the college draft.1 86 In Smith, the court applied the rule of

reason test en route to its determination that the draft constituted an
unreasonable restraint on free trade and thus violated antitrust

laws.187 In terms of its harmful effect, the court in Smith recognized
that the draft "inescapably forces each seller of football services to
deal with one, and only one buyer, robbing the seller, as in any
monopsonistic market, of any real bargaining power.1 ' 88 The court
183. See Stephen G. Bronars, Bargaining in Professional Football: Why NFL
Superstars are Underpaid 22 (Sept. 7, 2004) (unpublished article, on file with the
University of Texas at Austin Department of Economics), available at
http://econweb.tamu.edu/workshops/PERC%20Applied%20Microeconomics/Stephen%2
OG.%20Bronars.pdf ("The monopsony power inherent in a player draft system transforms
draft selections into valuable assets. If draft rights were traded for cash, their value would
be directly revealed by their market price.... NFL teams generate much of their excess
profits by paying superstars considerably less than their marginal revenue product.... The
exclusive right to negotiate a contract with a superstar player is a valuable asset; I estimate
that the right to negotiate exclusively with the top player in the 1994 draft was worth about
$38 million (in 2003 dollars). By 2004, when revenues per team and the salary cap were 82
percent higher than they were in 1994, the monopsony rents from the first selection in the
draft were valued at $70 million.").
184. McNeil Verdict, supra note 4, at *4 ("You have heard testimony about other NFL
rules, including the annual NFL college draft ....Because those other rules are not
challenged here, you are not being asked to decide whether those rules are an
unreasonable restraint of trade under the antitrust laws.").
185. 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
186. Id. at 1175 (affirming the district court's ruling that the NFL draft system violated
antitrust laws under a rule of reason analysis).
187. Id. at 1183-85 ("After undertaking the analysis mandated by the rule of reason,
the District Court concluded that the NFL draft as it existed in 1968 had a severely
anticompetitive impact on the market for players' services, and that it went beyond the
level of restraint reasonably necessary to accomplish whatever legitimate business
purposes might be asserted for it. We have no basis for disturbing the District Court's
findings of fact; and while our legal analysis differs slightly from that of the trial judge,
having benefited from intervening guidance from the Supreme Court, we agree with the
District Court's conclusion that the NFL draft as it existed in 1968 constituted an
unreasonable restraint of trade.").
188. Id. at 1185.
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also recognized less restrictive alternatives to a draft that granted
exclusive rights to a single team.18 9 For example, the League might
implement a system in which multiple teams could draft a player and
compete for his contract rights.19° Alternatively, a second draft could
be held prior to the season in which unsigned draft picks could be
drafted by different teams. 191 In addition, the court offered that fewer
rounds might mitigate the harmful effects of the draft to the point
that it would not violate the antitrust laws. 192
To fully satisfy the rule of reason requirements for establishing
an antitrust violation, the players will need to attack the League's
potential argument that the draft creates a benefit that outweighs the
harm. The League will undoubtedly point to competitive balance as
its saving grace. However, the players might argue that courts are split
as to whether or not competitive balance will be relevant with regard
to the NFL draft. 193 In Smith, the court declined to recognize
competitive balance as a procompetitive counterpoint to the restraint
on trade.19 4 However, more recently in Brown v. Pro Football, Inc.
(Brown ),1 95 a dissenting judge in the same court suggested that
competitive balance should play a role in a rule of reason analysis.196
Furthermore, McNeil allowed for competitive balance to rebut the
restraints on player movement. 97
With this precedent in mind, the players will want to distinguish
McNeil and the dissent in Brown I from the current allegations as
they relate specifically to the college draft. 198 The players will argue
that Smith acts as the guiding precedent on the unilateral imposition
of a draft system and that neither McNeil nor Brown I dealt with the
189. Id. at 1187-88.
190. Id. at 1188.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Compare id. at 1186 (declaring that competitive balance was irrelevant to the rule
of reason analysis of the draft), with Brown v. Pro Football, Inc. (Brown 1), 50 F.3d 1041,
1059-60 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Wald, J., dissenting) (implying that competitive balance is a
relevant procompetitive benefit that should be considered in a rule of reason analysis),
affd, 518 U.S. 231 (1996).
194. Smith, 593 F.2d at 1186.
195. 50 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1995), affd, 518 U.S. 231 (1996).
196. Id. at 1059-60 n.3 (Wald, J., dissenting) (questioning the use of the Smith
precedent that competitive balance will be irrelevant in a rule of reason analysis regarding
restraints on rookie players). The D.C. Circuit majority did not explicitly address the issue
of competitive balance as a counterpoint to restraints on free trade. Id.
197. McNeil Verdict, supra note 4, at *4.
198. See McNeil v. NFL, 790 F. Supp. 871, 897 (D. Minn. 1992). To distinguish the
analysis in McNeil from Smith, the court noted that "Smith involved a challenge to the
college draft as it existed before collective bargaining in 1968, and thus had nothing to do
with any restraints concerning the movement of veteran players." Id.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88

draft issue specifically. The players might also turn to other cases,
such as Robertson v. NBA, 199 in which a court specifically addressed
potential antitrust problems that arise from draft systems in
professional sports.2 °° The use of the Smith case and other precedent
will enhance the likelihood of success of the players' allegation that
the NFL draft violates antitrust laws.
IV. DODGING A BULLET: THE LEAGUE'S RESPONSE TO THE
COMPLAINT

In response to the players' complaint, the League should argue
two points. First, the League will want to assert a general defense to
antitrust liability on the ground that the League's nonstatutory labor
exemption has not expired despite the NFLPA's decertification.
Second, the League will want to specifically address each of the
allegations made in the players' complaint. This Part sets forth each
of these potential responses and identifies what it will take for the
League to dodge the antitrust bullets fired by the players' complaint.
A.

GeneralDefense

By negotiating to the point of impasse and decertifying the
NFLPA, the players would follow the precedent set by McNeil for
overcoming the nonstatutory labor exemption. Despite these actions,
the League may still argue that the exemption continues to apply
because the players would still have a de facto bargaining
representative. In effect, this argument would contend that a
collective bargaining relationship continues to exist between the
players and the League and that the players' act of decertifying the
NFLPA and withdrawing from negotiations is merely an act of
posturing. Based on such an argument, the court might find that a de
facto bargaining relationship continues to exist, which would mean
that the nonstatutory labor exemption continues to apply.
In order for the nonstatutory labor exemption to expire, the
parties must make good faith efforts to bargain to impasse and
beyond.2 ' In Powell II, the court recognized the Supreme Court's
characterization of impasse as "a recurring feature in the bargaining
process and one which is not sufficiently destructive of group
bargaining to justify unilateral withdrawal." 2" The court went on to
199. 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
200. Id. at 893-96 (suggesting in dicta that the NBA player draft and reserve clause
may violate antitrust laws).
201. Powell v. NFL (Powell 11), 930 F.2d 1293, 1304 (8th Cir. 1989).
202. Id. at 1299 (citing Charles D. Bonanno Linen Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 454 U.S. 404,
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hold that "a dispute such as the one before us 'ought to be resolved
free of intervention by the courts' where 'the union has had a
sufficient impact in shaping the content of the employer's offers' and
where the challenged restraint is 'clothed with union approval.' "203
Generally, the League unilaterally implements restraints taken from a
previous collective bargaining agreement that is certainly "clothed
with union approval." 2' The elements that the players will challenge
in this lawsuit are the same elements to which the NFLPA consented
in the prior collective bargaining agreement. Therefore, the League
will want to respond to the complaint by pointing to the
aforementioned language from the Powell II ruling which suggests
that courts should refrain from intervening on antitrust grounds in
cases like the one at hand. While the Powell H case did not directly
deal with a situation in which the NFLPA had decertified, its holding
implies that courts should look past posturing in labor relationships.
Therefore, the court should extend the nonstatutory labor exemption
beyond decertification if the League can establish that the
decertification was merely undertaken as a bargaining chip (or scare
tactic) to encourage the League to concede to the NFLPA's demands
with regard to a new deal.
The League made a similar argument in its pretrial motions in
McNeil.2 5 However, the court ultimately rejected the argument that
the decertification was not sufficient to terminate the collective
bargaining agreement. 2 6 In the course of its ruling, the court
determined that, "the termination of the collective bargaining
relationship... does not depend on either a judicial determination or
NLRB decertification: 'but rather depends on whether a majority of
the employees in a bargaining unit support a particular union as their
bargaining representative.' ",20 In the pretrial determinations, the
McNeil court recognized that the players had voted to abandon the
NFLPA as their bargaining representative. 208 As a result, the
2
collective bargaining relationship had terminated. 1
412 (1982)).
203. Id. at 1302 (quoting JOHN C. WEISTART & CYM H. LOWELL, THE LAW OF
SPORTS § 5.06, at 590 (1979)).
204. JOHN C. WEISTART & CYM H. LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS § 5.06, at 590

(1979); see supra Part I1I.A.
205. Powell v. NFL (McNeil 1), 764 F. Supp. 1351, 1358-59 (D. Minn. 1991) ("The NFL
defendants further argue that even if the NLRB decertified the NFLPA, this procedure
would be insufficient to end the labor exemption.").
206. See McNeil v. NFL, 790 F. Supp. 871,884-86 (D. Minn. 1992).
207. Id. at 884 (quoting McNeil 1,764 F. Supp. at 1367).
208. McNeil/,764 F. Supp. at 1358-59.
209. Id.
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The United States Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Pro
Football, Inc. (Brown II),21 however, might have reopened a door
that the McNeil rulings appeared to close.211 Without directly citing
the Powell II or McNeil decisions, the Supreme Court discussed the
outer limits of the nonstatutory labor exemption. 12 The Brown II
decision recognized flexibility with regard to the nonstatutory labor
exemption's limits. In the Court's majority opinion, Justice Breyer
acknowledged the need for flexibility and case-by-case analysis of the
nonstatutory labor exemption when he wrote, "[w]e need not decide
in this case whether, or where, within these extreme outer boundaries
to draw the line. Nor would it be appropriate for us to do so without
the detailed views of the [National Labor Relations] Board .... ,,23
The League should argue, in its defense against the players'
complaint, that the Brown II decision stands for the proposition that
no single triggering event leads to the expiration of the nonstatutory
labor exemption. In effect, this argument will contend that Brown II
overrules the McNeil court's pretrial determination that
decertification of a union terminates the collective bargaining
relationship. It follows that neither the decertification of the union,
nor a recorded vote by players to abandon representation by the
union, will by itself suffice to overcome the exemption. Instead, a
court will need to independently analyze the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the bargaining process between the
players and the League-and consult the NLRB-in making a
determination as to whether or not a collective bargaining
relationship exists between the players and the League. To buttress
its argument, the League should not completely abandon the
guidance of the McNeil ruling. In McNeil, the court held that "despite
[the NFL's] insistence that the NFLPA continues to function as a
union, defendants neglected to file a charge, pursuant to 29 U.S.C.
§ 160(b), with the NLRB asserting that the NFLPA engaged in an
unfair labor practice by unlawfully refusing to bargain with
defendants. '214 The League should, therefore, file the appropriate
charge with the NLRB as soon as the NFLPA decertifies. By using
the Supreme Court's ruling in Brown II, and following a portion of
the court's guidance in McNeil, the League will be able to put
210. 518 U.S. 231 (1996).
211. See id. at 250.
212. See id. ("[F]or these reasons, we hold that the implicit antitrust exemption applies
to the employer .....
213. Id.
214. McNeil v. NFL, 790 F. Supp. 871,886 (D. Minn. 1992).
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together a strong argument that the labor exemption has not expired.
Overall, if the League can prove that the decertification and player
vote to abandon representation by the NFLPA are merely bargaining
tactics intended to pressure the League in a broader negotiation
context, then the court should continue to apply the nonstatutory
labor exemption. If the court applies this exemption, then the
League's labor system would not be subject to antitrust scrutiny.
B.

Specific Defenses
In addition to its general defense against a collective antitrust
action, the League should tailor individual defenses to each of the
allegations included in the players' complaint. Assuming that the
court will address each of the allegations under a rule of reason
analysis,1 5 the League will be required to prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that each of the restraints is "justified by a legitimate
business purpose" and is "reasonably necessary to achieve that
purpose.216 In response to each allegation, the League should point
to competitive balance as the legitimate business purpose that the
challenged restraint seeks to advance.217 Courts have been
inconsistent in their recognition of competitive balance as a justifiable
business purpose in the context of restraints on the market for
players' services.21 The court in Mackey II approved competitive
balance as a legitimate business purpose that justifies restraints on

215.
216.
217.
218.

See supraPart I.A.
McNeil Verdict, supra note 4, at *4.
See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
See White v. NFL, 822 F. Supp. 1389, 1408 (D. Minn. 1993) ("The near certainty of

such inconsistency [in the court's recognition of competitive balance as a legitimate
business purpose] is borne out by the history of litigation between players and the NFL.
For example, in Mackey I1,the Eighth Circuit determined that the NFL's interest in

maintaining competitive balance between teams should be considered under the rule of
reason for purposes of determining whether a veteran player restraint violated the
Sherman Act. However, in Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., the Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia rejected the competitive balance justification as a matter of law,
finding that under the rule of reason, the NFL's interest in maintaining competitive
balance, which the NFL argued was a procompetitive effect, could not be balanced against
the anticompetitive effects of the college draft." (internal citations omitted)), aftd, 41 F.3d
402 (8th Cir. 1994); see also Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., Civ. No. 90-1071, slip op. at 19-23,
1992 WL 88039, at *9-10 (D.D.C. Mar. 10, 1992) (refusing consideration of competitive

balance in the context of using uniform salary provisions for "prospective Developmental
Squad players"), rev'd, 50 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1995), aff'd, 518 U.S. 231 (1996). Compare
Mackey v. NFL (Mackey I1), 543 F.2d 606, 619-20 (8th Cir. 1976) (accepting the

competitive balance consideration under the rule of reason analysis), with Smith v. Pro
Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (rejecting the competitive balance

consideration under the rule of reason analysis).
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trade,1 9 while the court in Smith did not recognize competitive
balance as a legitimate business purpose. 220 This inconsistency will
likely create problems for the League as it attempts to justify the
restraints it imposes.
Based on the assumption that the case will be filed in the
Minnesota district court, the League should turn to the McNeil case
as the persuasive authority on the issue of competitive balance as a
justifiable business purpose.22 1 In its instructions to the jury, the
McNeil court expressly recognized competitive balance as a legitimate
business purpose that could justify the restraints imposed by Plan B
Free Agency.222 The court went on to state, "[C]ompetitive balance
means that all of the NFL teams are of sufficiently comparable
playing strength that football fans will be in enough doubt about the
probable outcome of each game and of the various division races that
they will be interested in watching the games. 223 The League should
argue McNeil set the precedent that competitive balance can justify
restraints in the context of the NFL's labor system.
The League may turn to a few additional sources to support its
proposition that competitive balance serves as a legitimate business
purpose under the rule of reason analysis. Outside of professional
football, the Supreme Court has identified the proper use of
competitive balance in a rule of reason analysis. In NCAA v. Board of
224 Justice Stevens wrote, "The
Regents of the University of Oklahoma,
hypothesis that legitimates the maintenance of competitive balance as
a procompetitive justification under the Rule of Reason is that equal
competition will maximize consumer demand for the product. ' 225 This
supports the proposition set forth in the McNeil jury instructionsthat the maintenance of competitive balance can serve as a legitimate
business purpose. 226 By applying the Court's holding in Board of
Regents to the NFL, the League need only establish that the
competitive balance among teams in the NFL will increase consumer
219. See Mackey H, 543 F.2d at 621.
220. See Smith, 593 F.2d at 1186; see also Brown v. Pro Football, Inc. (Brown 1), 50
F.3d 1041, 1059 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Wald, J., dissenting) (noting that the district court
found irrelevant an analysis of "procompetitive effects," and the circuit court majority did
not reach the question of competitive balance at all), affd, 518 U.S. 231 (1996).
221. The McNeil trial was heard in Minnesota United States District Court's Fourth
Division, which is the forum in which the hypothetical lawsuit will be filed. See McNeil v.
NFL, 790 F. Supp. 871,871 (D. Minn. 1992).
222. McNeil Verdict, supra note 4, at *4 (instruction no. 27).
223. Id.
224. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
225. Id. at 119-20.
226. See McNeil Verdict, supra note 4, at *5.
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demand for football in order to properly establish that competitive
balance can serve as a legitimate business purpose under the rule of
reason.

227

The League should also point to Williams I, in which Judge
Kevin T. Duffy of the Southern District of New York denied
basketball players' complaints alleging that a salary cap, college draft,
and first refusal system violated antitrust laws under rule of reason
analysis.22 Judge Duffy recognized in his decision that the "procompetitive effects of these practices, in particular the maintenance of
the competitive balance, may
outweigh
their restrictive
229
consequences."
The League will need to make the argument that competitive
balance serves as a legitimate business justification with regard to
each of the alleged restraints. However, the argument advancing the
legitimacy of competitive balance will not change from allegation to
allegation. As a result, the League can make one broad argument
relating to competitive balance and the court's determination with
regard to whether the argument should apply to all of the League's
specifically tailored defenses. What will change from allegation to
allegation will be the extent to which the specific restraint imposed is
reasonably necessary to achieve competitive balance.
The remainder of this Part explains how the League can defend
each of the restraints-salary cap, free agency system, entering player
pool, and college draft-as a justifiable measure to maintain
competitive balance in the League.
1. Salary Cap
The NFL will have a strong argument that its salary cap has
served as the League's most significant asset in terms of maintaining
competitive balance. The hard cap system comes as close as possible
to ensuring that every team operates under the same constraints when
attracting and retaining talent. Other major U.S. sports leagues, with
the exception of the NHL, have labor systems that allow for teams to
spend more on players by paying luxury taxes or penalties for
surpassing certain compensation levels.230 This has the effect of
227. See id. at *4.
228. See NBA v. Williams (Williams 1), 857 F. Supp. 1069, 1071 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)
(discussing players' counterclaims in a declaratory judgment action), affd, 45 F.3d 684 (2d
Cir. 1995). The players alleged that the college draft, the right of first refusal, and salary
cap were "unreasonable restraints of trade not exempt from antitrust law and thereby
violate the Sherman Act." Id.
229. Id. at 1079 (emphasis added).
230. Tim Tucker, The NHL Locks Out Players: Season on Ice, ATLANTA J.-CONST.,
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creating a system in which teams in bigger, higher-revenue markets
have a greater ability to attract talent than teams in smaller, lowerrevenue markets. In the long run, these systems create competitively
imbalanced leagues with different tiers of talent. This imbalance then
detracts from the excitement and unpredictability of both individual
contests and competition for standings in a division or league.
Unlike these imbalanced systems, the NFL is considered by
many as the United States' most competitively balanced sports
league-a league in which all teams have nearly identical
opportunities to succeed at the beginning of the season. 23 1 In its
argument that a salary cap does not violate antitrust laws, the League
should compare its competitive landscape with other sports leagues
and point to the extent to which the NFL's financial success derives
from the balance that the salary cap creates.
The League can buttress the connection between the salary cap
and legitimate business purposes by pointing to analyses by
independent debt-rating agencies. Specifically, the League should
highlight that Fitch Ratings has directly linked the rating of the
League's debt with the survival of the salary cap to suggest that the
League would be a less credible borrower without the salary cap. In a
May 2008 press release, Fitch Ratings stated:
The salary cap has historically been a key factor incorporated in
the NFL's credit rating given that it promotes both competitive
balance among franchises and cost certainty. Fitch has often
cited that a key to the long-term viability to a sports league is
the competition between its clubs. There's a potential risk in
the long run that without a salary cap the competitive balance
of the NFL could be jeopardized. To the extent that the
competition among franchises weakens as a result of large
market teams and wealthy clubs opting to spend more money
on player salaries as compared to small market teams and less
wealthy clubs, there is the potential that the League could lose

Sept. 16, 2004, at D1 ("The only one of the four major pro sports leagues without a salary
cap or a luxury tax on high payrolls, the NHL seeks a new system that would tie player
costs to a predetermined percentage of revenues-a percentage that would be far smaller
than the 76 percent the league says went to players last season.").
231. See Travis Lee, Competitive Balance in the National Football League After the
1993 Collective Bargaining, J. SPORTS ECON., June 2009, at 1, 10; Rick Maloney,
'Competitive Balance' Keeps Football on Top, BUFFALO Bus. FIRST, Feb. 8, 2002,

http://www.bizjournals.comlbuffalo/stories/2002/02/11/newscolumn2.html (discussing the
NFL's advantage over other professional sports leagues due to its competitive balance).
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its strong historical competitive nature and furthermore, its
appeal to fans.232
Comments from independent agencies, like Fitch, provide powerful
evidence to support the legitimate business purpose of the salary cap.
Comparison to other leagues will also serve the NFL well in its
argument that the salary cap is important to the maintenance of
competitive balance. The NHL provides perhaps the best example of
the problems that can ensue without any salary restraints. Prior to the
2004-2005 labor dispute between hockey players and the NHL,
hockey was the only major professional sport in the United States
without any sort of luxury tax, salary cap, or revenue sharing
system. 233 Beyond competitive imbalance, the NHL's labor system
resulted in a league in which clubs spent about seventy-five percent of
their revenues on player salaries.234 Furthermore, these ballooning
player costs contributed significantly to operating losses for more
than two-thirds of the NHL's thirty franchises and a combined
league-wide loss of nearly $300 million.235 These devastating
operating results and the National Hockey League Players
Association's ("NHLPA") unwillingness to compromise on a salary
cap system led to a lockout that terminated the 2004-2005 season.
Ultimately, the NHL ended up with a salary cap system similar to that
of the NFL; in each league, the salary cap is adjusted annually to
equal a prescribed percentage of the league's revenue.236 As a result,
professional hockey provides a valuable analogy for the NFL in its
argument in favor of a salary cap. The NFL should argue that the
NHL's recent labor struggle shows the devastating effects of an
unrestrained labor market in professional sports. Furthermore, the
NHL's ultimate implementation of a salary cap strongly supports the
notion that a salary cap system is the best means of righting the
wrongs of an unchecked labor market.
The NFL might also turn to Major League Baseball ("MLB") as
an example of the type of imbalance that can occur without a salary
cap. In an amicus brief submitted to the Supreme Court in Brown II,
MLB described the imbalance of its league:

232. Fitch Actively Monitoring NFL's Collective Bargaining Agreement, BUS. WIRE,

May 20, 2008, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-mOEIN/is_2008_May_20/ain25437930.
233. Tucker, supra note 230.
234. Id.
235. Jeglic, supra note 97, at 24.
236. Tim Tucker, Season Lost to Hard-liners,ATLANTA J.-CONST., July 17, 2005, at D2
(comparing the NHL salary cap to the NFL's salary cap).
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Baseball has certain unique economic characteristics that, when
combined with its "wide open" system of free agency, have

placed the smallest-market clubs in constant peril. Most
important, there is great disparity in the revenues generated by
the clubs.... Baseball has clubs that generate local revenues

more than three times those of some of their competitors on the
field.
The wide revenue disparity among the clubs causes
difficulties because there is a single market for Baseball players.

In that single market, the clubs with the most revenue set the
price for free agent players. Clubs with less revenue are faced
with the difficult choice of paying the market rate or losing
their talent.
The combination of Baseball's player compensation system

and the revenue disparity in the industry has created serious
economic issues in the game. 37

In its comparison to baseball, the League needs to highlight that
it may overcome an antitrust challenge to the salary cap by showing
that the salary cap maintains competitive balance. 28 Baseball's labor

system did not create the type of catastrophic outcome that the NHL
experienced prior to the salary cap. However, the competitive
balance in baseball is not as evenly spread as in football. 239 Therefore,
237. Brief of Amici Curiae Office of the Commissioner of Baseball and Major League
Baseball Player Relations Committee, Inc. in Support of Respondents, Brown v. Pro
Football, Inc. (Brown II), 518 U.S. 231 (1996) (No. 95-388), 1996 WL 72350, at *9-10.
238. McNeil Verdict, supra note 4, at *4 ("In order to prove that the challenged Plan B
rules are justified by a legitimate business purpose, defendants must first demonstrate, by
a preponderance of the evidence, that the First Refusal/Compensation Rules in Plan B
actually make a significant contribution to the establishment or maintenance of
competitive balance in the NFL." (emphasis added)).
239. Ryan T. Dryer gave the following analysis of the NFL's advantage in competitive
balance:
In the NFL's 12-team playoff format, 25 of its current 32 teams (78.1%) became
playoff eligible in the five year period. Of those teams that participated in the
playoffs, only one was able to accomplish the feat in all five years, while 13 of
those teams only made the playoffs two or fewer times. An examination of the
NBA's 16-team playoff format over the same time period reveals that 25 of its 30
teams (83.3%), participated in the playoffs. Of those teams, five participated in the
playoffs all five years, while just eight made the playoffs two or fewer years. And
finally, in the MLB's eight-team playoff system, only 17 of its 30 teams (56.7%)
attended the playoffs from 2001-2005. Two of those teams were in the playoffs in
all five years and nine of those teams played in the playoffs in two or fewer years.
Over the five sample years the NBA, NFL, and MLB had 80, 60, and 40 playoff
positions available respectively. If the playoff positions occupied by the teams that
made the playoffs in every year are removed, assuming that those teams were in
fact superior to the rest of the teams in their league due to consistent performance,
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if football were to experience the type of inequality that baseball has
experienced in the absence of a salary cap, then it would not maintain
the competitive balance that it currently enjoys. Instead, this would
mean that the NFL's level of competitive balance would fall. The
NFL should also argue that baseball provides an example of what
occurs when a salary cap is not in place and that only the salary cap
system can ensure that the League does not fall to the level of
competitive imbalance which baseball has experienced.
The benefit of a full uncapped year prior to the litigation
presents a fairly substantial-but not impossible-obstacle for the
League to overcome in arguing that a salary cap is reasonably
necessary to maintain its competitive balance, and therefore
necessary to operate its business. The players will undoubtedly point
to the uncapped year and-absent any catastrophic collapse of the
NFL-suggest that it provides direct evidence that the League does
not need a salary cap and that the competitive balance was not much
different in an uncapped year than it was in a capped year."4 The
League may overcome the players' argument by asserting that a
single uncapped year will not indicate the full extent of harm that the
absence of a salary cap creates. Along these lines, the League should
argue that the harmful effects and competitive imbalance will not
come to fruition until all effective player contracts have been signed
under an uncapped system. One free agency period in which only a
small fraction of players are able to test the market cannot establish
the full effect of an uncapped League. Under this argument, the
League may suggest that it implemented the salary cap to avoid the
greater harm that could ensue from another uncapped year. Overall,
the NFL will have its strongest argument with regard to the validity of
a unilaterally imposed salary cap challenged under antitrust scrutiny.
2. Free Agency System
To rebut the players' claim that the current free agency system
violates antitrust law, the League would need to distinguish the
then what remains is the pool of playoff slots that the rest of the teams can
realistically hope to obtain. Thus, from 2001-2005 in MLB there were 28 teams
(93.3% of the league) competing for 30 (75%) of the playoffs spots. The NBA had
25 teams (83.3% of the league) competing for 55 (68.8%) playoff spots, and the
NFL had 31 teams (96.9% of the league) competing for 55 (91.7%) of its playoff
spots. These numbers suggest that the playoff races are more consistently "open"
in the NFL than in the NBA or MLB.
Dryer, supra note 98, at 287-88 (footnotes omitted).
240. See supra notes 116-20 and accompanying text (discussing players' argument
surrounding the uncapped year as evidence of the limited benefit of a salary cap).
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current system from the systems challenged in Mackey II and McNeil,
where prior restrictions on player movement were found to be
violations of antitrust law. 24 1 Furthermore, the League would need to
argue that the restraints imposed by the current free agency system
are necessary to maintain the competitive balance among the teams in
the League. A key factor distinguishing the current free agency
system from the systems in Mackey II and McNeil relates to the
nature by which the restraints were imposed in those cases. The
restraints in those cases-the Rozelle Rule and Plan B Free
Agency-were unilaterally imposed by the League without collective
bargaining. 242 Unlike the current free agency system, which the
players agreed to in a prior collective bargaining agreement, the
restraints in Mackey H and McNeil were never agreed upon by the
players.243 This distinguishing factor will buttress the League's
assertion that the three-tiered free agency system and the franchise
and transition designations are not unreasonable as evidenced by the
players' agreement to these terms in prior collective bargaining
relationships. Reynolds v. NFL244 will aid the League's argument that
previously agreed-upon constraints should survive antitrust attack to
a greater degree than unilaterally imposed restraints that did not exist
in a prior collective bargaining agreement.2 45
The Reynolds decision approved a class action settlement
stemming from the Mackey II trial.' In Reynolds, the Eighth Circuit
stated:
We emphasize today, as we did in Mackey, supra, that the
subject of player movement restrictions is a proper one for
resolution in the collective bargaining context. When so
resolved, as it appears to have been in the current collective
bargaining agreement, the labor exemption to antitrust attack
applies, and the merits of the bargaining agreement are not an
issue for court determination.24 7
This holding can be interpreted in two ways. First, it may be
interpreted strictly within the confines of the nonstatutory labor
241. Mackey v. NFL (Mackey If), 543 F.2d 606, 622 (8th Cir. 1976); McNeil Verdict,
supra note 4, at *1.
242. See Mackey 11, 543 F.2d at 610; McNeil v. NFL, 790 F. Supp. 871, 876 (D. Minn.
1992).
243. See Mackey II, 543 F.2d at 610; McNeil, 790 F. Supp. at 876.
244. 584 F.2d 280 (8th Cir. 1978).
245. See id. at 282 (arguing that collectively bargained issues should withstand antitrust
scrutiny).
246. Id. at 281.
247. Id. at 289.

2009]

DUSTING OFF THE AK-47

exemption. 2 8 Alternatively, this statement may be interpreted to
suggest that any restraints on player movement that stem from a
collective bargaining agreement should not be subject to antitrust
scrutiny. The League will want to focus on this latter interpretation,
which derives largely from the first sentence of the excerpt cited
above. In accordance with this interpretation, the League will argue
that the player movement restraints that would be challenged by the
players in the case at hand were the product of a prior agreement.
This will be a tenuous argument that courts will likely see as an
overextension of the nonstatutory labor exemption.
The League should also distinguish the current free agency
system from the systems in Mackey II and McNeil and highlight the
courts' recognition that not all restrictions on player movement
violate antitrust laws. In Mackey II, the court recognized that "li]t
may be that some reasonable restrictions relating to player transfers
are necessary for the successful operation of the NFL. The protection
of mutual interests of both the players and the clubs may indeed
require this. ' 24 9 The League cannot deny that the Rozelle Rule
challenged in Mackey II was found to have violated the antitrust laws.
However, the Rozelle Rule created far greater restraints than the
current free agency system. 250 Under the system challenged in Mackey
II, "only six of the more than 500 free agents actually changed teams"
from one season to another.25 1 In comparison, over 200 players
252
changed teams from 2008 to 2009 via free agency.
In distinguishing the current restraints from Plan B Free Agency
and the McNeil verdict, the League will want to argue that the current
system only allows for clubs to exclusively protect its first- and
second-year players in addition to one or two franchise and transition
players. This translates to the protection and restraint of
approximately ten to fifteen players per team compared with the
restraint of thirty-seven players per team under Plan B Free
Agency. 253 As a result of these comparisons, the League should argue
248. When Reynolds is limited to the scope of the nonstatutory labor exemption, it
only serves as reinforcement to the precedent that labor systems cannot be challenged by
parties between whom there is an ongoing bargaining relationship.
249. Mackey v. NFL (Mackey I/), 543 F.2d 606, 623 (8th Cir. 1976).
250. See supra text accompanying notes 144-47 (explaining the restraints imposed by
the Rozelle Rule).
251. Goldberg, supra note 42, at 50.
252. NFL Events: Free Agency, http://www.nfl.com/freeagency (last visited Nov. 15,
2009).
253. See, e.g., Carolina Panthers: Player Roster, http://prod.www.panthers.clubs.nfl.
com/team/roster.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2009) (showing that the Carolina Panthers had
eleven first- and second-year players in 2009 in addition to the ability to designate one
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that the current restraints do not nearly equate to the same level of
"harm" as prior constraints that were deemed violations of antitrust
law.
With regard to the franchise and transition designations, the
League will have a strong argument that these restraints do not
violate antitrust laws because they do not create a substantial harm. A
player receiving the franchise or transition designations is ensured to
receive compensation that is at least the average of the top five to ten
players at his position.254 As a result, the League should argue that
these restraints ensure fair compensation to franchise and transition
players.
Overall, the League will have a difficult battle against the
allegations challenging the current free agent system. This Comment
suggests that in the defense of this system the League should focus on
rebutting the players' proposition that the system creates substantial
harmful effects, as opposed to focusing on the system's advancement
of competitive balance. That said, it will be important for the League
to argue that the current systems somehow aid in the maintenance of
the League's competitive balance.
3. Entering Player Pool
In response to the players' allegations that the entering player
pool violates antitrust laws, the League should take three positions.
First, it should distinguish the entering player pool from what the
court defined as a wage scale in McNeil 5 Second, the League should
argue that the ballooning values of rookie contracts rebut the players'
argument that the entering player pool has harmful effects on the
market for player services. Finally, the League should argue that the
entering player pool helps the League maintain its competitive
franchise and one transition player).
254. See supra notes 135-43 and accompanying text (discussing the tender
requirements for franchise and transition players).
255. See McNeil v. NFL, 790 F. Supp. 871, 875-76 (D. Minn. 1992) (discussing the wage
scale elements of Plan B Free Agency). When addressing the wage-scale issue, the court
stated:
Under one provision of [Plan B], defendants proposed to eliminate all individual
contract negotiations with players as of February 1, 1993 and to establish a wage
scale setting the price for all NFL players' services. In [their] complaint, plaintiffs
allege that the proposed Plan B wage scale is an agreement among competitors,
the NFL member clubs, to fix the prices to be paid for plaintiffs' services as
professional football players and as such constitutes a per se violation of § 1 of the
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).

Id. at 876.
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balance because it reduces drafted players' ability to strong-arm
teams into contracts with huge salary cap implications that would
cripple the teams' ability to attract talent in the free agent market.
To rebut the players' argument that the entering player pool
creates a wage scale, the League can distinguish the wage scale
concept that the court left open for challenge in McNeil from the
entering player pool found in the current collective bargaining
agreement.2 16 In McNeil, the court addressed a proposal by the
League to "eliminate all individual contract negotiation with players
...and to establish a wage scale setting the price for all NFL players'
' In contrast, the entering
services."257
player pool does not eliminate
any individual contract negotiations. Therefore, the League should
argue that the entering player pool cannot fall under the court's
analysis of a potential wage scale in McNeil.
Even if the League succeeds in making this argument, it must still
establish that the entering player pool either does not create a
substantially harmful effect or that it is reasonably necessary to
maintain competitive balance within the League. The ballooning of
rookie compensation in the past ten years will provide significant
support to the League's rebuttal of any harmful effect. In the past
three years, NFL draft picks have signed some of the League's most
lucrative contracts.2 8 The League might argue that the entering
player pool, in comparison to a stricter rookie wage-scale system like
that of the NBA, allows for rookies to freely negotiate the terms and
259
values of their deals.
The League should also make an argument with regard to the
competitive balance benefits of the entering player pool, in order to
protect against a court decision that the pool does create a
substantially harmful effect. The competitive balance argument will
be a difficult one for the League to make with regard to the entering
player pool, especially in light of the salary cap and the draft. It seems
that the salary cap and the draft achieve the competitive objectives
256. See supra Part II.B.3.
257. McNeil, 790 F. Supp. at 876.
258. Matt Ryan signed a six-year $72 million contract as a rookie in 2008. See Rachel
Cohen, Ryan Respects Goodell's Point on Rookie Contracts, BOSTON GLOBE, July 1, 2008,
http://www.boston.com/sports/football/articies/2008/07/01/ryan-respects-goodells-point-o
n-rookiecontracts/. Jake Long received a five-year $57.75 million contract from the
Miami Dolphins as a rookie in 2008. See Goodell Decries Lucrative Rookie Contracts,
MIAMI HERALD, June 28, 2008, at 6D.

259. See Michael A. McCann, The Reckless Pursuit of Dominion: A Situational
Analysis of the NBA and Diminishing Player Autonomy, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 819,
824-25 (2006) (discussing the NBA's rookie wage scale).
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that the League might argue for with regard to the entering player
pool. The salary cap limits teams' ability to hoard talent via
overcompensation, and the draft allows for an even distribution of
entering talent. However, the League might argue that the entering
player pool is necessary to the function of both of these other
restraints, which combine to support competitive balance in the
League. Here, the League would assert that without the entering
player pool, drafted rookies might consume disproportionate salary
cap space because they have significant bargaining power with their
drafting clubs. Drafted players have substantial bargaining power
because their names have already attached to the team in the public
eye and fans expect for their teams' drafted players to sign and play
for the team. Added to the publicity dynamic is the amount of time
and consideration that teams put into their draft picks. Teams often
draft players for specific needs that they have foregone in the free
agent market. Without the limitations imposed by the entering player
pool, this bargaining power would likely lead to disproportionate
consumption of the salary cap, which in turn would adversely affect
the salary cap's utility as an instrument of competitive balance in
veteran free agency.
Overall, the League will not have very compelling arguments
with regard to the value of the entering player pool as it relates to
competitive balance in the League. Its best argument with regard to
this restraint will surround its rebuttal of the entering player pool's
harmful effect on players.
4. College Draft
In addressing the players' allegation that the college draft
violates antitrust laws, the League will have to directly address the
D.C. Circuit's ruling in Smith. This 1978 ruling held that the NFL's
college draft violated antitrust laws.26° The League will need to
dispute the application of the Smith ruling in its defense of the college
draft allegation and may do so on a few grounds. First, the League
can highlight the differences between the college draft at the time of
Smith versus the college draft today. Second, the League can argue
that the Smith court's analysis is outdated because it failed to
acknowledge the competitive balance benefits of a draft, which
should be considered in an antitrust analysis. Third, after attacking
the persuasive authority of the holding in Smith, the League should

260. Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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argue that the restraints imposed by the college draft are reasonably
necessary for the maintenance of competitive balance in the League.
A lot has changed since the D.C. Circuit's 1978 ruling that the
NFL's college draft violated antitrust laws. From a technical
standpoint, today's college draft covers a substantially smaller group
of players than the 1968 college draft challenged in the Smith case.
The 1968 draft consisted of sixteen rounds for twenty-six teams,
meaning that it affected over four hundred players.2 61 Today's college
draft consists of only seven rounds, and in 2008, 252 players were
selected.2 62 The drastic reduction in the size of the draft has resulted
in a rookie free agent market in which teams compete based on price
for the services of rookies. The 1968 draft also differs from today's
draft because the 1968 draft was not a product of collective
bargaining. Instead, the 1968 draft was imposed by the League's
bylaws. 263 The draft system that the players would challenge in the
hypothetical lawsuit, however, is a product of collective bargaining.2 6
Most significantly, the court in Smith explicitly declined to make a
ruling on the modified player draft system that the League adopted in
the 1977 collective bargaining agreement between the NFL and the
NFLPA. In a footnote, the court stated, "We express no views on the
legality of the modified NFL player draft, confining our attention to
the draft as it existed in 1968. "1265 The modified player draft that the
court declined to comment on has many more similarities to the
current draft structure than the 1968 draft. The differences between
the 1968 draft and today's draft, combined with the fact that the Smith
court failed to address the modified 1977 draft, would support the
League's argument that the Smith ruling does not provide a
persuasive authority on the legality of the current draft system.
In addition to the technical differences between the 1968 draft
and today's draft, the League should argue that the Smith case does
not serve as a persuasive authority due to an important change in the
legal landscape regarding the treatment of competitive balance as a
261. Id. at 1176 n.5.
262. NFL Events: Draft 2008 Tracker, http://www.nfl.com/draft/2008/tracker#dt-tabset-1:dt-by-round/round-1 (last visited Nov. 15, 2009).
263. Smith, 593 F.2d at 1175.
264. See CBA, supra note 92, art. XVI.
265. Smith, 593 F.2d at 1176 n.6 ("The modified draft is far less restrictive than the one
described in the text; it continues for fewer rounds (thus applying to fewer players),
eliminates the selecting team's 'perpetual' right of negotiation with its players, facilitates
players' becoming 'free agents,' and establishes minimum salary levels for 'rookies.' ...
We express no views on the legality of the modified NFL player draft, confining our
attention to the draft as it existed in 1968." (internal citation omitted)).
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justification for restraints on trade in the sports industry. The Smith
court declined to recognize competitive balance as a justification for
the restraints imposed by the draft. 66 Since this ruling, however, some
courts have taken a different approach and recognized competitive
balance as a justification for restraints. 267 As a result, the League
should argue that the Smith analysis of the draft system is
unpersuasive in light of the current state of the law.
Once the NFL makes these arguments, it must turn to the
importance of the college draft as it relates to the competitive balance
of the League. More specifically, the League must establish that the
college draft is not more restrictive than is necessary to maintain the
League's competitive balance. There is little doubt that the draft
contributes to parity in the League by granting the worst teams an
opportunity to obtain the best incoming talent every year. However, a
mere contribution to parity will not necessarily pass antitrust
scrutiny.2 68 Instead, the League would probably need to show that the
full scope of the draft-all seven rounds and the nature of a club's
rights to a drafted player-is necessary. This necessity will be difficult
to prove, especially when it comes to the later rounds of the draft.
However, this will become a question for the finder of fact at trial,
and the League may be able to introduce data that supports its theory
that a disruption of the current draft system would disturb the
competitive balance in the League.
V. ASSESSING THE DAMAGE: WHY THE PLAYERS WILL EMERGE
VICTORIOUS

It appears the League will face an uphill battle if the players
pursue an antitrust action like the one described in this Comment.
The players seem most likely to prevail. However, complex lawsuits,
266. See id. at 1186 ("The draft is 'procompetitive,' if at all, in a very different sense
from that in which it is anticompetitive. The draft is anticompetitive in its effect on the
market for players' services, because it virtually eliminates economic competition among
buyers for the services of sellers.... Because the draft's 'anticompetitive' and
'procompetitive' effects are not comparable, it is impossible to 'net them out' in the usual
rule-of-reason balancing. The draft's 'anticompetitive evils,' in other words, cannot be
balanced against its 'procompetitive virtues,' and the draft be upheld if the latter outweigh
the former. In strict economic terms, the draft's demonstrated procompetitive effects are
nil.").
267. See NBA v. Williams (Williams II), 45 F.3d 684,688-89 (2d Cir. 1995) (recognizing
competitive balance as a procompetitive counterpart to economic restraint in the NBA);
McNeil Verdict, supra note 4, at *4 (recognizing competitive balance as a legitimate
business purpose that may overcome the harm created by Plan B Free Agency in the
NFL).
268. See Smith, 593 F.2d at 1185.
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like the one set forth in this Comment, make even the most
resounding victories ambiguous. A more piecemeal evaluation of the
lawsuit provides better insight into the legitimacy of the players' socalled AK-47.
Before advancing to the individual allegations, the reader should
first recognize that the League will not likely succeed in its general
defense that the nonstatutory labor exemption continues to apply.269
This argument presents a question of law that must be decided by the
judge, and the players will have a substantial advantage here because
of the legal precedent set 'in Brown H. In Brown H, the Supreme
Court recognized the power and competency of the NLRB when it
comes to labor disputes.27 ° Justice Breyer's majority opinion
suggested that the NLRB was the proper venue for resolving these
disputes and deferred to their expertise in this arena.271 If a court
were to rule that a collective bargaining relationship continued to
exist between the players and the League, despite the decertification
of the NFLPA, this would effectively diminish the credibility of the
NLRB, conflict with Justice Breyer's opinion in Brown H, and
undercut U.S. labor policy as a whole. Therefore, the League will not
likely succeed in its argument that the nonstatutory labor exemption
continues to apply because the collective bargaining relationship
between the players and the League has not terminated. Instead, the
court will most likely defer to the NLRB's acceptance of
decertification en route to determining that the nonstatutory labor
exemption has expired. Once the court ignores the League's general
defense, the finder of fact will have the opportunity to decide whether
the individual labor constraints imposed on the League-salary cap,
free agency system, entering player pool, and college draft-violate
antitrust laws.
The League will have the strongest argument against the
allegation that the salary cap violates antitrust laws. This will likely be
the only allegation on which a finder of fact decides in favor of the
League. The NFL is widely recognized as a "the model of parity in
professional sports," and the League can draw strong connections
between this recognition and its unique implementation of a "hard
269. See supra Part IV.A.
270. See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc. (Brown II), 518 U.S. 231, 250 (1996) ("Nor would
it be appropriate for us to [decide on the outer boundaries of the nonstatutory labor
exemption] without the detailed views of the [National Labor Relations] Board, to whose
'specialized judgment' Congress 'intended to leave' many of the 'inevitable questions
concerning multiemployer bargaining bound to arise in the future.' " (quoting NLRB v.
Truck Drivers, 353 U.S. 87, 96 (1957))).
271. Id.
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'
The League can persuasively argue that its "hard"
salary cap."272
salary cap has contributed substantially to the competitive balance of
the NFL in comparison to other leagues that have not implemented
such a salary cap. Furthermore, if the NFL were to eliminate its hard
cap system in favor of a soft cap system like the NBA or a luxury tax
system like MLB, then the NFL can logically argue that it would
suffer from the same competitive inequalities of these other leagues.
Such a change in the competitive landscape would equate to a decline
in the competitive balance of the League, which antitrust precedent
has upheld as a proper justification for the implementation of a
restraint.273 As a result, a finder of fact will likely find that the salary
cap's competitive benefits justify and outweigh its harmful restraints
and that the NFL's salary cap, therefore, does not violate antitrust
laws.
The League will not likely achieve the same success with regard
to the other allegations, partly because a strong argument that the
salary cap plays a necessary role in achieving competitive balance
weakens the argument for the necessity of the other restraints. In
other words, a finder of fact who agrees that the salary cap is
necessary to maintain the competitive parity in the League might also
conclude that the salary cap is such a great equalizer that other
restraints are unnecessary. Furthermore, the League's argument that
the other restraints advance competitive balance is much more
tenuous than the salary cap argument.
The players will likely emerge with a decisive victory with regard
to the challenge of the free agency system. The fact finder will not be
able to ignore the substantial similarities between today's free agency
system and the Rozelle Rule and Plan B Free Agency, both of which
were found to violate antitrust laws in previous lawsuits.274 By
highlighting the substantial similarities to these prior systems, the
players can successfully argue that the three-tiered free agency system
and the franchise and transition designations are merely extensions of
systems that have already been established as antitrust violations.
Furthermore, players can turn the League's own salary cap argument
against it, by asserting that the salary cap adequately resolves the

272. See Dryer, supra note 98, at 286 ("The NFL is generally viewed as the model of
parity in professional sports, while the MLB has come to represent professional sports in
its most dynastic form.").
273. For a discussion of antitrust precedent surrounding competitive balance, see supra
text accompanying notes 215-29.
274. See Mackey v. NFL (Mackey I1), 543 F.2d 606,614-23 (8th Cir. 1976) (finding that
the Rozelle Rule violated antitrust laws); McNeil Verdict, supra note 4, at *1 (finding that
Plan B Free Agency violated antitrust laws).
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competitive balance issues that the free agency system arguably
addresses.
Similarly, the players will probably emerge with a decisive
victory with regard to the entering player pool. The connection
between the entering player pool and League's competitive balance
argument will be too disjointed for a finder of fact to determine that
this restraint is reasonably necessary. The League might have a
compelling argument that the entering player pool does not result in
any requisite harm by pointing to the rising salaries of today's
rookies.2 75 However, the players can overcome this argument and can
likely establish harm by pointing to the rookies who are drafted in the
later rounds of the draft.276 Furthermore, the League will have a
difficult time connecting the entering player pool to a legitimate
business purpose in light of the existence of a salary cap and the
college draft.
The NFL will have stronger arguments against the players'
college draft allegations than their allegations surrounding the
entering player pool and the free agency system. While the draft
system's restraints potentially contribute to the competitive balance
of the League, a finder of fact would more likely find that the draft
system is more restrictive than necessary and that it, therefore,
violates antitrust laws. In its current form, the college draft essentially
forces players to lose a year of earning potential if they do not agree
to contract terms with their drafting team. It seems that the League
could implement a less restrictive system that still contributes to
competitive balance and if the fact finder agrees, then the college
draft will be deemed to violate antitrust laws. Smith will provide
persuasive authority on this outcome and the players can likely
persuade jurors that an alternative, less restrictive, draft system could
achieve the same competitive objectives as the current draft system. 177
Therefore, the players will likely win with regard to this allegation.
CONCLUSION

The last time the NFL lost a major antitrust suit against the
players, it paid $195 million to settle the claims of all of the players. 78
275. See supratext accompanying notes 258-59.
276. See supra text accompanying notes 165-69 (discussing the harmful effects of the
entering player pool on the rookies drafted in later rounds).
277. See Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1187-88 (D.C. Cir. 1978); see also
supra text accompanying notes 189-92 (discussing examples of less restrictive draft
systems that might not violate antitrust laws).
278. Goldberg, supra note 42, at 52.
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This analysis suggests that the League could once again face similar,
yet more substantial, liabilities if it does not extend the collective
bargaining agreement with the NFLPA. Therefore, the League's early
termination of the collective bargaining agreement could be
accelerating a process that will be more detrimental to the League
than an extension of the current agreement.
In a 2008 e-mail to the NFLPA, NFL Commissioner Roger
Goodell listed three reasons for the early termination: high labor
costs, problems with the entering player pool, and the "league's
inability, through the interpretation of the courts, to recoup bonuses
of players who subsequently breach their contract or refuse to
perform. ' 279 A new collective bargaining agreement could resolve
these issues, and an early opt-out certainly accelerates the prospect of
a new agreement. However, the NFLPA's rhetoric thus far has
suggested that the players will not appease the League's complaints in
a new agreement. 28 ° Instead, the players expect for the next
agreement to give them a bigger piece of the League's revenue pie
and expect an increase in the League's labor costs. Furthermore, the
players have made these demands with the full knowledge that the
League will not fare well in an antitrust lawsuit that will likely ensue
if the sides do not extend the current agreement. As a result, the
League's posturing and opt-out have accelerated the potential for an
antitrust lawsuit that could create severe consequences for the
League. If NFL owners allow for the current agreement to expire, the
issues that Goodell expressed in his e-mail will pale in comparison to
the costs of an antitrust lawsuit and the potential for a completely
revamped labor system. The McNeil verdict still has teeth and the
players' AK-47 still has firepower. In the end, the League will make a
grave mistake if it decides to test the players' fortitude by allowing
the collective bargaining agreement to expire because the players will
come fully armed for an antitrust fight that the NFL's current labor
system cannot withstand.
SEAN

W.L. ALFORD

279. Clayton, supra note 16.
280. See supra text accompanying notes 20-21 (discussing examples of the NFLPA's
stance with regard to an extension).

